According to the English version

The land war in the Falklands opened on the 2nd April 1982. The Argentine forces landed 120 commandos at Mullett Creek at about 4.30am , who attacked the British Marines' barracks. Fortunately the Royal Marines were already deployed and thus avoided heavy loss of life. The Argentine commandos then joined the force marching on Government House with the intention of seizing the British Governor Rex Hunt. A fierce battle ensued and the British were pinned down by the Argentines. A second group of British marines overlooking the harbour managed to hit one of the Argentine landing craft with an anti-tank weapon before withdrawing back to Government house. 

The British government were swift in their decision to send a task force to recapture the islands. A large part of No.3 Commando was aboard the refitted Canberra when she left port on Good Friday to the strains of 'Rule Britannia' from the quayside. A small squadron of SAS went ahead aboard H.M.S. Antrim. By mid April the task force arrived in the South Atlantic. The Task forces first objective was the recapture of South Georgia. In very bad weather Wessex helicopters took off carrying the Mountain Troop of D Squadron SAS. 

The British 3 Commando Brigade waded ashore at San Carlos a few minutes before 4 a.m. on Friday 21st May. 2 Para waded ashore an hour later and took their positions on the Summit of Sussex mountain to protect the approaches of Goose Green soon after first light. A few minutes after 2 Paras landing, 40 Commando came ashore a few hundred yards further north behind the Scorpion and Scimitar Armoured vehicles of the Blues and Royals to be met by the filthy SBS reception party who had been on the hill for days.

 A short time later, the British confirmed that there were no Argentine troops in the area. On the flagpole beside the local managers house, Men of C Company of 40 Commando raised the Union Jack at first light. See Troops Out

Across the water, 45 Commando had taken up positions in the abandoned refrigeration plant at Ajax plant without incident. 3 Para landed very late after delays. The whole of 3 Commando was ashore without significant loss. As 2 Para struggled up Sussex mountain, two pairs of Pucara ground-attack aircraft attacked. The first pair was blown out of the sky by handheld missiles and shipboard Sams, the second pairs attack failed to inflict casualties  on 2 Paras' B Company.

42 Commando was landed in the afternoon, this did not however improve the Task Forces air defense. The 12 Anti-Aircraft Rapier missile launchers, operated by 'T' (Shah Sujah's) Battery from 12 Air Defence Regiment Royal Artillery under the Operational Control of 3 Commando brigade, some of which were damaged after so long exposed to the salt water during the sea crossing needed some time to be set up and realigned. 

The 25th May saw the Exocet missile claimed the Atlantic Conveyor and with her the vital Chinook and Wessex helicopters along with the tentage for the entire landing force. All but one of the Chinooks were lost, ending the hopes of the Task Force for a fast overland hopping campaign. Instead the Landing Forces preceded with a two pronged attack on Port Stanley. The forces left the San Carlos on the 27th May. The northerly prong of 45 Commando advanced on and secured the unoccupied hamlet of Douglas before meeting 3 Para who had gone straight to Teal Inlet arriving there before everyone else, at Teal Inlet on the 29th May. From here the combined force headed to Mount Kent, west of Stanley. The marines and commandos were each carrying an average of 120 pounds of equipment on their historic march across East Falkland.

 The Southerly force, 2 Para headed to Darwin. Their mission was to capture the hamlet of Goose Green. Intelligence thought that there was a small Argentine garrison there. This proved to very wrong information. 2 Para soon encounter heavy oppression from a Argentine force over 1,200 strong. The battle was a hard slog for the Paras as they found the Argentineans were well dug in and waiting for them. After the Battle there were rumours that the BBC World Service had announced on their news that 2 Para were going to attack Goose Green just before the attack was to go in. 

 Leaving their bergens behind, 3 Paras marched in fighting order with food and ammunition, their vehicles coping brilliantly with the adverse conditions. On the 31st May, K Company 42 Commando embarked on helicopters and landed on the slopes of Mount Kent to be greeted by the SAS OP party and immediately dived for cover when they spotted a fire fight taking place a mile north.

 2 Para then continued overland past Swan Inlet house to Bluff Cove with a short helicopter hop by A Company to secure the northern bank and wait for 5 Brigade to arrive. 5 brigade were unable to march across the Falklands, having missed out on the vital six day acclimatization period 3 Commando had benefited from. So a second landing was staged in terrible weather, including 70 knot winds. The first units of 5 brigade were put ashore on the beaches. After much delay, the Guard of 5 brigade took over the positions of 2 Para who retied to the shearing sheds at Fitzroy to dry out. 

Three days after this catastrophe, 3 Commando and 5 Brigade launched the battle for Port Stanley. The first act was to clear the mountains of Argentine soldiers and their snipers who were equipped with night vision scopes. The ensuing actions involved bitter fighting as 3 Para advanced over the mountains blasting Argentine positions with mortars and anti- tank weapons Storming argentine positions some times in bayonet charges. Ian Mackay, a Platoon sergeant led his platoon against an Argentine bunker, and lobbed in two grenades before he was killed himself. he was awarded a Posthumous Victoria Cross.

 No 45 and 42 commando captured Two Sisters and Mount Harriet, then the 2nd battalion Scots Guards moved on Tumbledown Mountain as the 1/7 Gurkhas attacked Mount William before joining the 1st Welsh guards in the assault on Sapper Hill. some of the most bitter fighting took place on the mountains surrounding Port Stanley. 2 and 3 Para advanced on Mount Longdon and through the old marine barracks at Moody Brook Barrack and into Port Stanley. On 14th June at 2100 Hours, the Argentine forces surrendered. 11,313 Argentines were taken prisoner and were herded aboard British ships for repatriation.

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The first RAF mission after the Argentine invasion was a reconnaissance sortie flown by a Nimrod MR1 of No.42 squadron from Ascension Island which surveyed the Argentine forces on and around the Islands in support of the submarines deploying ahead of the main task force. These mission continued until 15th April when No.42 was relived by Nimrod MR2s, some armed with self defense Sidewinder missiles from the Kinloss wing.

On the 21st April, Sea Harriers of No.800 Squadron intercepted an Argentine Air Force Boeing 707 carrying out a reconnaissance over the task force, it was escorted out of the area. Four days later British Forces recaptured South Georgia and a Royal Navy Wasp damaged the Argentine Submarine Sante Fe with AS12 missiles.

On 30th April, A Vulcan bombed Stanley airfield in the first of the Black Buck raids. Three Vulcans, drawn from Nos. 44 and 50 Squadron then on the verge of retirement, were deployed to Ascension and from there one flew 3,500 miles - with airborne refuelling - to drop twenty one 1,000lb bombs on the runway from 8,000ft at 0438 hours local time before returning to Ascension. It had been refuelled 17 times en route by Victor tankers and was airborne for 15 hours 45 minutes to complete the longest bombing mission on record at that time. The following dawn, Sea Harriers attacked the airfield at low level. One of the Harriers was damaged by ground fire.Pictured right is a Vulcan courtesy of Edd Draper from his Royal Air Force site

The following day, the Argentine Cruiser was spotted by Canberra PR9s of No.39 Squadron operating clandestinely out of Chile, and subsequently sank by H.M.S. Conqueror. meanwhile the Task Force entered the 300 mile Total Exclusion Zone around the Islands and attacked the airfield with naval gunfire. On the night of 3rd May, the Vulcans made a second 'Black Buck' raid on Port Stanley.

The 4th May saw H.M.S. Sheffield hit by an Argentine Exocet missile, she subsequently sank. The same day, the first Sea Harrier was lost to enemy ground fire. Meanwhile, nine Harrier GR3s from No.1 Squadron from the Uk to Ascension in 9 hours and 15 minutes, having been adapted to carry Sidewinders and naval 2 inch rockets. Two days later, the Task Force lost two Sea Harriers when they failed to return from a Cap and are presumed to have collided in bad weather.

The 7th May saw Britain extend the TEZ to within 12 miles of the Argentine coast and two days later an Argentine surveillance trawler was found within the TEZ and strafed by Sea Harriers, and sunk after the crew surrendered. A period of bad weather followed restricting flying for both sides, although the SAS destroyed a number of Argentine aircraft on the ground at the Pebble Island airstrip during the night of 
14/15th May.

The following day two Sea Harriers strafed Argentine supply vessels in Falkland Sound, damaging one so badly that it had to be beached. The 18th May, saw the RAF Harriers from Ascension arrive onboard the freighter Atlantic Conveyor, from where they transferred to the H.M.S. Hermes, the following day three of them dropped cluster bombs on a fuel dump near Fox bay. The main amphibious landing took place on 21st May, with the Harriers providing air defense and ground support. The Frigate H.M.S. Ardent was destroyed by rocket fire from Argentine aircraft, but the Harriers accounted for three Skyhawk and three Daggers with Sidewinder Air-to-air missiles and another two Pucaras with gunfire. Two pumas and a Chinook were destroyed on the ground in the mount Kent area. one Harrier was shot down by ground fire and its pilot captured.

More ground support sorties were flown on the 23rd, including bombings of airstrips at Dunnose Head and Pebble Beach, destroying a number of Pucaras. H.M.S. Antelope was crippled by A-4 Skyhawks in San Carlos water the same day. The next day saw Sea Harriers and RAF Harriers dropped 1,000lb bombs, managed to damage a number of aircraft despite exceptionally heavy fire. A Sea Harrier was lost when it crashed into the sea, killing its pilot. While Sea Harriers accounted for a Mirage and three Daggers. The following day, the Skyhawks were back in force, sinking H.M.S. Coventry. Argentine Super Etendards launched Exocet missiles which set fire to the Atlantic Conveyor and caused her to be abandoned later along with her precious cargo of Chinooks. Harriers destroyed an Argentine Puma near Douglas settlement using cluster bombs. Harrier raids on the airfields were repeated the next day and again on the 27th. Another Harrier was downed during the 27th, again by ground fire. the pilot was rescued.

The 28th saw three Harriers support 2 Para and encouraged 1200 Argentine troops to surrender on the following morning. The 30th May was marked byHarriers mounting 10 close support sorties, one used Laser Guided Bombs, although they were ineffective due to the failure of the Forward Air Controller to be in the correct position. A third Harrier was lost to ground fire, but the pilot was plucked form the sea within minutes by a helicopters. A third Black Buck mission hit Stanley Airfield that night, the Vulcan being armed with American Shrike missiles, which temporarily disabled the radar. Meanwhile, Argentine Canberras bombed troop positions at San Carlos with little success. The 1st June was opened with a series of raids on Stanley airfield, but a pair of Harriers failed to intercept some MB339s reported in the area. However, two Harriers of No.801 squadron attacked an Argentine Hercules and shot it down, a similar aircraft (if not the very same aircraft) was reported to have bombed a British Tanker two days previously.

A Second Black Buck anti-radar sortie was mounted on the night of 2/3 June, but failed because the Argentineans shut the radar down. The Vulcan was forced to land in Brazil and was impounded until the 11th June following damage to its refuelling probe. The remaining missile was confiscated. Bad weather again intervened until the 5th June

The next sorties were on 5th June, when Harriers flew eight close support and armed recce sorties in search of ground-based Exocets. On the same day, the San Carlos prefabricated airstrip went into operation. A Harrier was damaged by a near-miss with a Surface to Air Missile and landed roughly at the prefabricated airstrip. Heavy Argentine air activity provided the Sea Harriers with plenty of chance for Target practice on the 8th June, when they downed three Skyhawks. However, four others got through and bombed the troopships Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram, leaving 53 dead. Two more Harriers had arrived during the day, following a 3,500 mile flight. Another tanker was bombed by an Argentinean Hercules on the 12th June, but the bombs failed to explode. More close support sorties followed for the next few days, including the last Black Buck mission on the night of 12/13 June, with 1,000lb bombs.

The 13th June saw the first successful Laser Guided Bomb sorties against an enemy 155 mm gun, which was destroyed at Mount Tumbleweed. A similar sorties the following day was called off when negotiations began.

On the 14th July 1982, the Argentine troops surrendered. During the eight week conflict 28 Sea Harriers flew 1,435 operational sorties shooting down 20 enemy aircraft plus three probables, while 14 Harriers flew a total of 126 sorties and the Vulcans five. They were supported by 375 Victor Tanker, 111 Nimrod and more than 600 Hercules and VC10 sorties with countless helicopter missions.

Helicopters in the Falklands War

When Argentina invaded the Falklands Islands and South Georgia on Friday, 2nd April 1982 a British task Force sailed within 72 hours comprised of H.M.S. Hermes and H.M.S. Invincible both carriers were equipped with the Harrier V/STOL fighter and Westland Sea King helicopters. Some of their escort vessels were carrying the Westland Lynx HAS Mk I or Westland Scouts and Wasps. The task force carried a sizeable detachment of Royal Marines and British Army units. The flexibility of the helicopter and harrier was what made the recapture of the Falkland Islands possible. The Task force also included the two assault ships H.M.S. Fearless and Intrepid, and several requisitioned merchant ships acting as troops transports and the Atlantic Conveyor which was employed as a make-shift aircraft carrier, and helicopter landing platforms were added to ships such as the Queen Elizabeth II, Canberra and Uganda. RAF Boeing-Vertol Chinook and Westland-Aerospatiale Puma helicopters were also carried.

Westland Wessex helicopters inserted and took off an SAS patrol on South Georgia, despite loosing two of their number in the appalling conditions. The pilot was awarded the DSO for taking off from South Georgia in such appalling conditions with a massive overload of seventeen soldiers and naval airmen (Crew of the two previously crashed Wessexes). Later, SAS and SBS units were transported by helicopter to take control of the principal settlement on South Georgia, Gritvyken without a shot being fired, almost 200 Argentine soldiers were taken prisoner.

Throughout the Falklands campaign the helicopter provided vital transport. Although several helicopters were lost in accidents, very few were lost to enemy fire due to the skill and courage of the pilots when faced with the Argentine Kfir, Mirage and Skyhawk fighters. Whereas the Argentine forces lost two Pumas and a bell UH-1 Iroquois to attack by Royal Navy Sea Harriers. The Helicopter enabled just 600 men of 2 Para to take positions held by almost 2,000 Argentine troops, in a complete reversal of normal military doctrine which calls for an attacking force of three or four times the number of the defending one. Helicopters also evacuated casualties from the stricken RFA Sir Tristram and Sir Galahad while both ships were burning, and their ammunition 'cooking off'.

The lack of Airborne Early Warning aircraft available to the British fleet following the scrapping of the Royal navy's conventional aircraft carriers and the subsequent sinkings of a number of Task Force ships convinced the Admiralty that such an aircraft was needed and Royal Navy ASW Sea Kings were converted after the war to serve this role.

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On Wednesday March the 31st 1982 British intelligence indicated that the Argentine fleet would be moving into position for a seaborne assault on the Falkland Islands within the next 48 hours. The Argentine force had sailed under the overall command of Vice Admiral Juan Lombardo. Most of the ships sailed on Friday 26th March from the port of  Puerto Belgrano. Rex Hunt the Governor of the Falklands, was informed by London of the Argentineans possible intentions. Governor Hunt immediately summoned the two senior Royal Marine officers on the island to Government House to discuss the defence of the Falklands. Saying " Sounds like the buggers mean it.

At the time of the Argentine invasion the islands were defended by Naval Party 8901 (NP 8901) that consisted of a Royal Marine garrison of about troop strength. It just so happened that NP 8901 was in the process of its annual rotation, with one troop arriving and one troop returning to the UK (a fact that the Argentine intelligence did not know). Major Norman's troop of Marines were being relieved by a troop commanded by Major Noott. This gave Rex Hunt a total of 67 Royal Marines to defend the Falklands. Major Norman, being the senior of the two Majors, was placed in over all command and Noott was made military adviser to the Governor.   12 of Major Noott's troop had already sailed to South Georgia aboard H.M.S. Endurance under the command of Lt. Keith Mills. They had been sent to keep an eye on some Argentineans at Leith.

Rex Hunt also sent calls out to the 120 members of the Falklands Islands Volunteer Defence Force, made up of local men. These men had never fired a shot in anger and had only been called into action once before in 1966, when 30 Argentinean nationalists, hijacked an Argentinean plane and landed it at Stanley race course to free the oppressed islands from the British. The Argentines were shocked to find they were not welcome. They were quickly surrounded and sent back to Argentina on a British ship.  The response to Governor Hunts "Call to arms " was very disappointing. Because of the distance, some of the members of the defence force had to travel, only 23 managed to reach Port Stanley to help in the town's defence. Two officers and nine men from H.M.S. Endurance were also in Stanley at the time. As Major Norman was taking stock of his limited forces Jim Airfield, an ex-Royal Marine Corporal, who had moved to the Falklands, arrived at the Marine barracks at Moody Brook and demanded to be given a weapon saying, "There's no such thing as an ex-Marine ". He was given a rifle and fought alongside the Marines. Also a Canadian, Bill Curtis, who was a former air traffic controller, was sent by Norman to Stanley Airport to deactivate the airports directional beacon.

On the morning of the 1st of April, at 11am, Major Norman briefed his forces, telling them " Tomorrow you're all going to start earning your pay. " The Marines took it well, but some of the members of H.M.S. Endurance became very wide eyed. Norman then deployed his troops ( see Map ). His basic plan was to disrupt any Argentine landing at the airport or harbour. No 5 Section, commanded by Cpl. Duff, and was placed south of Stanley Airfield, with a GPMG, covering the beach on that side of the town, after they had first placed various construction vehicles on the runway to prevent any Argentine troop transports landing. Marines Milne and Wilcox of No. 5 section were sent with a GPMG to cover the Yorke Bay beaches just north of the airport. They both had motorcycles to ensure a quick get away. At Hookers Point, No 1 section commanded by Cpl. Armor was placed with No 2 section commanded by Cpl. Brown, just behind them on the old airstrip. To the west of these two sections was Lieutenant Bill Trollope with eight men. Lt. Trollope placed his men on the edge of the old airstrip. These men were armed with a 84mm Carl Gustav and 66mm rockets. These weapons were just about the only heavy support weapons the Marines had. Earlier Major Norman was disgusted to find out the NP 8901's only 81 mm mortar, had a cracked tube and could not be fired. No 3 section was placed 1 km north of these positions.

No. 6 section, commanded by Cpl. York was deployed near Stanley harbour. They placed their Gemini assault boat in a hidden cove, with orders to resist any Argentine ships trying to enter the harbour, whether they were landing craft or aircraft Carriers. Finally Marine Mike Berry was sent on a motorcycle to the top of Sapper Hill.  From this height, with his radio, he would be able to report to Major Norman any Argentine attempts to land. The motor coaster Forrest, skippered by Jack Sollis, was place in Port William to act as a seaborne early warning radar. At Cape Pembroke lighthouse, Basil Biggs, the lighthouse keeper, turned off the lamp and stood look out for enemy shipping from his high vantage point. Chief Secretary Barker, Police Constable Lamb and a detachment of Royal Navy personnel under the command of Colour Sgt. Noone, rounded up all Argentine citizens in Port Stanley. About 30 Argentines were rounded up, mostly employees of the Argentina State Oil Company. No mention can be found to say if the islanders were ever informed as to the possibility of an Argentine invasion.  The Marines and the other defenders settled down and waited for the Argentine invaders to arrive.

At 9pm on the evening of Thursday the 1st of April the Argentines commenced Operation 'Rosario', the Argentinean code name for the "Liberation of the Malvinas"  ( see Map ). The destroyer Santisima Trinidad (an ex British type 42 destroyer) hove-to 500 meters off Mullet Creek, south of Port Stanley, and lowered 21 Gemini assault boats into the water containing 92 men of the Argentine Amphibious Commando, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Guillermo Sanchez-Sabarots. Lieutenant Schweitzer's small advance party went ashore first to secure a beachhead at Mullet Creek. They then waited to guide the main party in. The main party soon pushed off from Santisima Trinidad, but found the going hard.  The current had changed and started to push the boats to the north, driving them into a field of sea kelp. The kelp wound itself around the propellers of the Gemini's causing many of the outboard motors to splutter to a halt. It took a long time and a lot of swearing before the commandos managed to extract themselves from the kelp and it was 11pm by the time they landed near Lake Point and finally joined up with Lieutenant Schweitzer's advance party.  On Sapper Hill, Marine Berry had heard the sound of the Argentine commandos trying to extract themselves from the kelp and radioed Norman to say he could hear the sound of engines revving out to sea, but Norman judged them to be helicopter engines.

At 1.30 am the Argentine commandos split into two groups and moved off to their objectives. Sanchez-Sabarots took his group to attack the Royal Marine barracks at Moody Brook while Lieutenant Commander Pedro Giachino took the other group around Sapper Hill to attack Government House and capture Governor Hunt. Giachino, who was normally 2IC of the 1st Marine Infantry Battalion, had in fact volunteered to accompany the commandos on Operation 'Rosario'. By the end of the day's fighting his name was known in every Argentine household.

At 11pm, the Argentine submarine Santa Fe gently surfaced off Kidney Island. Unfortunately for her, she was spotted straight away by Forrest's radar and Jack Sollis reported the submarine's presence to Government House. Ten tactical divers left the submarine aboard three Zodiacs and headed to a beach just east of Yorke Point, code named " Red Beach " where they placed navigation beacons.

It took Sanchez-Sabarots and his group five hours to cover the six miles to Moody Brook Barracks. During the march Lieutenant Bardi, who was acting as lead scout, fell and broke his ankle. He had to be left behind. At 5.45 am the Argentine commandos reached the Marine barracks and proceeded to attack the buildings with heavy automatic fire and deadly phosphorous grenades. This appears to have been very violent tactics for troops who later claimed that they used blank ammunition in order to save lives. This assault soon stopped when it was realized that the barracks were in fact empty. Major Norman had decided the day before that there was no point in trying to defend the barracks and had moved his HQ to Government house. The Argentine commandos, now feeling very confident after the easy capture of their first objective, now moved to join Giachino's group for their second objective, Government House. The picture on the right shows the destruction caused to the Royal Marine barracks some time after the war.

The noise of the assault on Moody Brook barracks had alerted Norman that the Argentines had landed. At the time he was at Out Look Rocks near Government House. He immediately drove back to Government house and radioed all his sections to return to Government House. Realizing that he was being attacked from various directions, he had decided to centralize his defence around Government House.

Giachino's group, having arrived on a small hillock near Government House, using night vision aids, observed the Royal Marines preparing for an attack. Giachino's plan was to enter Government House from the rear and "Invite Governor Hunt to surrender". Earlier in the year, Rex Hunt had unwisely given a copy of the plans of Government House to a visiting Argentine, who claimed to be an architect. However, Giachino did not seem to be aware of these plans as he and his 16 men advanced on Government House thinking they were entering the back door, when in fact they were entering the servants annex. At 6.15am, Giachino leading four of his men, kicked down the door to the annex. Three Royal Marines had been placed by Norman to cover the annex, Cpls. Sellen and Fleet and Marine Dorey. As Giachino and his men burst though the door they came under a hail of fire from the Royal Marines. The Battle for Stanley had started.

Giachino was hit almost at once trying to throw a grenade. Another Argentine officer was also hit in the leg, while the others ran and hid in the maids' quarters. Governor Hunt and Chief Secretary Barker took cover under the Governor's desk while the defenders of Government House and the Argentine commandos exchanged fire. A stalemate now developed, with Giachino lying badly wounded in the annex, the grenade, with its pin removed, still in his hand. An Argentine medic tried to reach him but was also wounded by a grenade. The British tried to get Giachino to throw away the grenade so he could be helped, but Giachino refused to do so, thinking, possibly, that it grenade might bounce back at him. There was also a language problem, as none of the British spoke Spanish and none of the Argentines spoke English, so the three wounded men were left were they fell. Later after the surrender of Government house, Argentine medics tried desperately to save Giachino, but he had lost too much blood and died shortly afterwards. He was to be the fist Argentine to be killed in the conflict. Most Argentine soldiers through out the conflict carried a eulogy written for Giachino. It reads thus.

The Malvinas Are Argentine

Many hued skies, majestic above the sea, 
A rapid flight of white seagulls 
Fleeing from the infernal thunder of guns, 
Eternal witness, the Southern Cross,

Imposing white and blue standard, 
May you bless it, may all-powerful God, 
There is the silence of death round about us, 
The blood of brothers lives in grief.

Struggle of people, fervour, lamentations, 
Voices of the Anthem, flag on the balcony! 
A song of the brotherhood, glory and unction.

Impassioned verses of Pedroni 
Have anchored at your port, SOLEDAD.... 
"Come home to the Fatherland, to eternity!

Nidia AG Otbea de Fontanini

Around about the time Lieutenant Commander Giachino was kicking in the door to his own mortality, Sollis on Forrest and Lighthouse keeper Basil Biggs both reported seeing Cabo San Antonio, a former United States tank landing ship, enter Port William, about a mile North-East of Yorke Bay.  She was being escorted by the destroyer Hercules and the corvette Drummond. At 6.20 Cabo San Antonio's bow doors were opened and the leading wave of LVTP-7s  (Landing Vehicle Tracked Personnel) LVTPs of E company 2nd Marine Infantry Battalion  (Infantry de Marina) slid into the water and headed for the Yorke Beaches guided by the navigation lights placed earlier by the tactical divers. This first wave was commanded by Lieutenant Commander Santillans. At 6.30 am the LVTPs hauled themselves ashore onto the beach. Santillans reported that the beach was clear allowing the 14 remaining LVTPs of E Company to approach the beach. On board two of these LVTPs were Commander Alfredo Weinstabl, commander of the 2nd Marine Infantry Battalion and Rear Admiral Carlos Busser.  Second Lieutenant Reye's section advanced to capture Cape Pembroke lighthouse. D company also landed soon afterwards and joined Santillan's LVTPs as they started to advance down the road to Stanley.

As the LVTP column passed the old airfield, they came in range of Lt. Bill Trollope's section; he gave the order to open fire.  The LVTPs were each armed with a 12.7mm machine gun that made these amphibious troop carriers a formidable threat to Lt. Trollope and his small section of Marines. Marine Gibbs, armed with a 66mm anti-tank rocket launcher took aim at the lead Argentine APC and opened fire, but missed. An  84mm Carl Gustav round fired by Marine Brown found its mark and stopped the lead LVTP dead. The Argentine marines inside the LVTP were unhurt and quickly evacuated the vehicle. The other Argentine LVTPs now spread out and opened up with their 12.7mm machine guns on Trollope's section positions. Lt. Trollope ordered a withdrawal back to Government house, happy that at least one of the Argentines APC would not give the Marines any problems in the near future.

While this action was taking place, the defenders at Government House were still exchanging shots with the few Argentine commandos that surrounded the building. During this time Major Norman received a report from Cpl. York's No. 6 section, which was still covering the harbour in a Gemini assault boat.  Cpl. York came over the net (radio) saying he had three possible targets to engage and wanted Major Norman to tell him what his target priorities were. " What are the targets? " Norman asked York over the net. York replied, " Target number 1 is an aircraft carrier, target number 2 is a cruiser... " At that moment the radio went dead.

After his radio died on him, Cpl. York, decided it was time to pull out. His men first booby-trapped their Carl Gustav using grenades. York then tried to send a final message to Norman, saying " I'm going fishing " a cryptic reference to a comment he had made earlier the day before to Norman when asked what he intended to do if the Argentines did invade. York's section paddled their Gemini out over the kelp before starting the engine and headed north across Port William. Not long after starting the engine, York was horrified to find an Argentine destroyer chasing his small boat.  He quickly made for the shadows of a Polish fishing factory ship that was anchored near the shore, then headed into shore and pulled up on a small beach. The section hid the Gemini and melted into the hills, with only their fighting order. For three days York and his Marines traveled slowly northwest, knowing that the rest of NP 8901 had been captured by now. They went undetected by Argentine helicopters. On the 4th of April York and his
 men reached a small shepherd's hut near Estancia owned by Mrs. Watson. York had no radio or supplies and was now concerned for Mrs. Watson's safety if the Argentines found them and a firefight started. Reluctantly he decided to surrender to the Argentines. Using a kelper's radio he advised the Argentines where his section was, then ordered his men to destroy and bury their weapons. A Major Dowling (of Irish decent with a hatred for all things British) accompanied by men of the 181 Military Police Company flew to the shepherd's cottage by helicopter. After landing the Argentines roughly searched York and his men, then tied them up with wire. The Marines were then placed aboard the helicopter and flown to Stanley where Major Dowling had them thrown into cells at Stanley Police Station, where they remained until they were repatriated back to the UK. Major Dowling overstepped his authority on several other occasions and was eventually sent back to Argentina in disgrace.

Rear Admiral Busser was starting to get a little concerned by the fact that the British had managed to hold up his advance on Government House and he had not yet linked up with the Commandos. He now ordered the 1st Marine Battalion to be flown in by helicopters from Almirante Irizar along with a section of 105 mm rocket launchers. Marine Berry on Sapper Hill reported seeing these helicopters heading for Stanley. Meanwhile at Government House, the three survivors of Giachino's section were still hiding in the maids' quarters, their presence unknown to the British, until they decided to try and break out and reach the attacking forces around Government House. As they were preparing to move they were heard by Major Noott, who opened fire into the maids' room ceiling. The three Argentines came tumbling down the stairs and surrendered to the British. They became the first Argentine POWs of the war.

At 8.30 am, Governor Rex Hunt and Major Norman faced up to the fact that the Argentines had landed in force and the defence of Government House could not last much longer so they discussed what to do next.  One suggestion was that the Marines should now disperse into the island's interior and carry on the fight in guerrilla style warfare. After a little thought this idea was thrown out because it would be impossible for the Marines to survive on the island without heavy support that would be a long time coming.  While this discussion was taking place, the battle for Government House was intensifying and Rex Hunt was starting to get very worried about civilian casualties if the fighting continued into Stanley itself.  He now invoked the 1939 emergency powers that named him Commander in Chief of all Her Majesties Forces in the Falkland Islands and ordered the now vastly out numbered Marines to surrender to the Argentineans, saying he was doing this to save lives.

Hunt then sent for one of the local Argentineans, an ex-Argentine Air Force officer called Hector Gilobert who worked for the Argentinean State Air Line LADE (Linea Aerea Del Estado). Chief Secretary Barker had been unable to find him when rounding up other Argentines the day before. It was generally thought by most islanders that Gilobert was in fact an Argentinean intelligence officer and he had supplied the invasion planners with information about NP 8901. Gilobert was soon found and sent to Government House where Hunt asked him to negotiate a cease-fire so that the civilians in Stanley would not be harmed.  Gilobert left Government House, passed though the Argentine lines and delivered Hunt's message by radio to Major General Garcia aboard Santisima Trinidad, who was in overall command of the Malvinas Theatre of Operations.

General Garica passed on the proposal to Admiral Busser in Stanley, who agreed to the cease-fire. Busser relayed that he would meet the British out side St. Mary's Church. The Argentines had thought to bring a white flag for the use of such meetings, but it could not be found, so they used white plastic bin bags instead.  Busser and his aides were taken to Government House where they were met by Hunt, Noott, and Norman.  Hunt refused to shake Busser's hand saying, " This is British property. You are not invited."

Bussers was visibly upset when the former Governor refused to shake his hand. Negotiations proceeded at a very civil level, apart from the interruptions by the anti-British Major Dowling, who later mistreated Cpl. York's section. After talking to Busser, Hunt consulted Norman and Noott and agreed to surrender. At 9.30 am, 149 years of British Colonial rule came to an end, the Falkland Islands were now in Argentinean hands. The Argentine flag was raised over Government House to cheers from the Argentine troops.  Hunt was allowed to change into his official ceremonial regalia and was driven to the airport in his official car. (a London taxi) At the airport he was placed aboard an Argentine C130 Hercules and flown to Montevideo and from there he was flown back to London.

No such niceties for the members of NP 8901. The Royal Marines were stripped of their weapons and webbing and forced to lie face down on the ground in front of Government House with their hands behind their heads.  They were not physically mistreated by the Argentines, but the humiliation they all felt was terrible.  The Argentine press took many photos of the Royal Marines lying face down on the ground with Argentine marines guarding them.  The Argentines did not realize it at the time but by taking these photos of the defeated Royal Marines they had just added smoke to the fire that was now burning in the heart of the British public back in Britain.  When these photos were later published in newspapers in Britain there was an outcry of support for the British Government to take back the Falkland Islands.

The Royal Marines of NP 8901 and the members of the Island's Defence Force were moved to the playing fields where more pictures were taken.  On the picture on the right at least one member of the Defence Force can been seen as well as several Royal Navy personnel. Also, at least three of the sitting men are making rude gestures towards the photographer. The Royal Marines were later marched to the airport and placed on a C130 Hercules heading for Montevideo. As one of the Royal Marines was being marched onto the aircraft he turned to his Argentine guard and said " Don't make yourself too comfy mate, we'll be back ". He wasn't wrong. After returning to the UK and giving much valuable intelligence to the Task Force commanders, Major Norman and his men returned to their Moody Brook barracks 76 days later as part of 42 Cdo RM.

Cpl York and his section of five Marines who were isolated on the western side of the narrows saw from their position that the Argentines were laying an ambush for them. As they had a Gemini hidden on the opposite side of the headland, they decided it was time to make a tactical withdrawal. Loading their kit into the the Gemini, and in order to avoid detection paddled their way to make good their escape. Suddenly round the headland came an Argentine Destroyer at full speed. It quickly spotted them, and in the words of Marine 'Butch' Urand 'I think we did 100 mile per hour!'. And to its everlasting credit the Johnson outboard motor sprang into life, and they made good their escape, first hiding behind a Polish Fishing vessel and then running their Gemini into the shallows out of reach of the Argentines. They lived in caves on diddle-do-berries for three days before their final capture. When taken, the Argentines were a little confused as to what rank three badge Marine Urand was (three Badges being long service stripes) because is chums had nicknamed him 'The General'. Being older than the rest, The Argentineans decided that discretion was the better part of valour and introduced him to 'The General' to the local naval commander, an Argentine Admiral.

Marine Jeffery Urand and the rest of NP8901 were flown to Argentinia, Marine Urand and his little party were kept separately from the remainder and intensively interrogated. Although no physical violence was used, the technique was aggressive and at times threatening. Their heads were shaved and they were kept in solitary confinement, before eventually being sent home. Now back again with the task force, Now suddenly he heard the  unforgettable voice of his interrogator again. A officious Argentine captain was addressing a company of forlorn conscripts before dispersal on to the airfield. Marine Urand strolled up behind and tapped the Argentine captain on the shoulder:' 'Allo My Darlin', Fancy us meeting like this again,' The military police officer paled, Gulped and quickly disappeared into the ever changing throng of POWs.

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22nd April 
Two Wessex's lost 
During the operation to retake South Georgia bad weather trapped SAS men on a glacier and a Wessex 3 and two Wessex 5's were sent to retrieve them. The first Wessex from H.M.S. Tidespring lifted off as the wind whipped up the snow but the pilot lost his bearing in the snow and crashed, skidding for some 50 yards and finally tipping over. The other two helicopters had now embarked their troops, so they lifted and landed next to the crashed Wessex and took on her aircrew and soldiers. Both aircraft dumped fuel to carry the extra load.

The Wessex 3 returned to H.M.S. Antrim to wait for a break in the weather. An hour later an opportunity presented itself and the Wessex 3 flew back, embarked the survivors and flew back to H.M.S. Antrim piloted by Lt-Commander Ian Stanley RN, who was awarded the DSO.

23rd April 1982 
Sea king lost 
A Sea king HC.4 of No.846 sqn, carrying out a night  vertical replenishment mission from Hermes, ditched in the sea. The pilot was rescued but PO Air crewman Casey drowned.

6th May 1982 
Two Sea Harrier losses; Lt. W.Curtis and Lt-Commander J. Eaton-Jones Killed. 
Two No.801 Squadron Sea Harriers crashed in fog. It is thought that the two aircraft collided with each other in the fog

19th May 1982 
Sea King Lost 
A Sea King crashed while moving a large group of SAS troops from H.M.S. Hermes to H.M.S. Intrepid killing 22 men. The Sea King had taken off from H.M.S. Hermes at dusk. The Aircraft was slightly over loaded but because it was short fight the pilot reduced his fuel load to lighten the helicopter. At 300 ft the Sea King started it's decent towards H.M.S. Intrepid. those on board heard a thump, then another from the engine above them. The Sea King dipped once then dived . Within four seconds it hit the water. Some men were killed instantly and other knocked unconscious in the initial impact. Amazingly 9 men managed to scramble out of the open side door before the helicopter slipped below the waves. They were the only survivors. Rescuers found bird feathers floating on the surface were the helicopter had impacted the water. It is thought that the Sea King was the victim of a bird strike. One theory is at the Sea King was hit by a Black Browed Albatross which has a 8 ft wing span. The SAS lost 18 men on this night. The regiment had not lost so many men at one tine since the end of the second world war. The accident killed a member of the Royal Signals and the only RAF casualty of the war Flt Lt G.W. Hawkins.

21st May 1982 
On the morning of the San Carlos landings a Sea King helicopter carrying Rapier missiles and escorted by a light Gazelle helicopter, armed with a pintle-mounted machine gun and pod mounted SNEB rockets, flew straight over an Argentine party, which had evacuated Port San Carlos when the landings started. The Argentines opened fire and heavy accurate machine gun fire struck the Gazelle, mortally wounding her pilot Sergeant Andy Evans. Even so, he managed to turn away from the fire and ditch in the water.  The two crew men were thrown from the aircraft when it hit the water. As they struggled in the water, the same Argentines who had shot the helicopter down, opened fire on the two crew men in the water, despite their officer ordering them to cease fire. The Argentine troops continued to fire on the two helpless men struggling in the water for 15 minutes. When the shooting stooped Sergeant Ed Candlish, managed to drag Evans ashore, where he died in his arms. The Sea King they were escorting had managed to avoid the fire. This incident had marked effect on the British troops in the Task Force.

Minutes later a second Gazelle, unaware of the peril ahead, followed the same route and was raked by machine gun fire from below. The helicopter crashed to the ground in flames. When rescuers dragged the crew, Lt. Ken France and Lance Corporal Pat Giffin, from the wreckage they found them dead. Surgeon Commander Rick Jolly arrived at the crash site soon after in a Wessex from Canberra. There was nothing he could do for the France or Giffin, but he decided to return the bodies of the two men back to the task force, which was against orders, but he did so out of respect. That evening aboard the landing ship Sir Galahad, the Brigade Air Squadron held a memorial service for their three dead colleagues and all three were buried at sea. Sergeant Ed Candlish recovered form his ordeal abaord HMS Uganda.

23rd May 1982 
One Sea Harrier lost; Lt-Commander G. Batt killed. 
On a night mission to bomb Port Stanley, Sea Harrier crashes into the sea and blows up after takeoff. Lt-Commander Batt did not have time to eject and died in the crash.

25th May 1982 
A Westland Lynx, six Westland Wessex HU5s and three Chinooks lost 
When the Argentines bombed and sank the Atlantic Conveyor. Six Westland Wessex's of FAA 848 Squadron, three of five Chinooks of RAF 18 Squadron and a Lynx of FAA 815 Squadron were lost.

28th May 1982 
Scout Helicopter lost 
Pilot Lt. R. J. Nunn flying a Scout of B Flt, 3 CBAS and his Air Gunner Sergeant Belcher were operating in Direct Support to 2 Para during the Battle of Darwin and Goose Green. He was flying as a pair with his Flight Cdr, Capt J Niblett and Sergeant Glaze in another Scout from B Flt. Casualties from both sides were being flown back to Ajax Bay and small arms and mortar ammunition was flown forward to the Battalion. About 11.55 hrs, Niblett & Nunn, with their crewmen, were tasked to fly forward and pick up Col. "H" Jones, CO 2 Para, who had been wounded. As the pair of Scouts left Camilla Creek House at very low level, heading towards Darwin, they were attacked by two Argentine Pucaras flown by Lt. Giminez and Lt. Cimbaro. These two had left Stanley earlier and descended through low cloud into the Goose Green area and by chance met the two Scouts head on. Despite avoidance turns and evasive flying, Nunn's aircraft was hit by a short burst of cannon fire and then he was killed with a burst of machine gun fire during a second attacking pass from Giminez. The aircraft crashed immediately and burst into flames. Sergeant Belcher survived the crash despite having one leg severed by cannon fire and being thrown clear during impact. Niblett and Glaze evaded the attack from Cimbaro through application of skilful and violent evasive flying and later returned to the scene to evacuate Sgt Belcher. Nunn was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross and was buried along with other members of 2 Para who died on that day. After the attack the two Pucaras headed back to Stanley. They flew so low that stones and mud from the ground shattered Cimbaro's canopy. Both aircraft flew into low cloud and Cimbaro lost radio contact with Giminez. He never returned to Stanley. Sadly his body was not found until 1986 when the wreckage of his aircraft was discovered on Blue Mountain. He had flown straight into the mountain in zero visibility. Lt. Giminez was buried at Goose Green by his family. They were the first Argentine relatives to visit the island since the end of the War. Capt Niblett was awarded the DFC for his distinguished flying on the 28th and later in the campaign. Sgt Glaze was given a C in C's Commendation for his contribution during Op Corporate.

29th May 1982 
Sea Harrier lost. Lt Commander M. Broadwater ejected and picked up. 
No.801 Squadron Sea Harrier slides off deck in high winds. Pilot ejects and is picked up.

5th June 1982 
Gazelle lost 
A British Army Gazelle was shot down near Port Fitzroy, possibly by Sea Dart from H.M.S. Cardiff. 
The Gazelle  was carrying two aircrew and two members of 5th Infantry Bde HQ and Signal Squadron (the OC, Major Mike Forge, and the squadron Quartermaster Sergeant). It is believed that the chopper was shot down by the Royal Navy as the aircraft was exceeding the speed/height restrictions imposed on friendly aircraft. The practice was that all friendly helicopters flew below 100 feet and at less than 100 knots (or something similar). Any aircraft exceeding these limits would therefore be hostile and could be engaged. It was some years however before the MOD admitted that it was a blue on blue contact and we all thought at the time it had been shot down by ground fire.  ( Thank you to Barrie lovell for the information on the above 5th of June incident ) 

Guy Smith writes: 
I flew over the wreckage that morning. We knew that day that one of our ships had shot it down with a missile. I recall hearing at the time that they had made the flight at night, and so we assumed that perhaps they had flown high to avoid terrain. We had been briefed that we would be shot down by our own side if we flew more than 2000 feet (two thousand feet) above sea level.  However, communications and information for those of us camping ashore were spotty at best, and I would not be surprised if the Gazelle crew had not been briefed on this.

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During the Falklands war, British submarines were the first warships to reach the islands and began to enforce the Exclusion Zone around them. Of these vessels, H.M.S. Conqueror (Arrived 16th April) was the one to gain fame, becoming the first nuclear powered submarine to sink an enemy ship in combat. The diesel powered Oberon/Porpoise class H.M.S. Onyx (Arrived 28th May) served in a patrol area along with the two Swiftsure submarines: H.M.S. Spartan (Arrived 12th April) and H.M.S. Splendid (Arrived 19th April). As well as patrolling against Argentine submarines, these warships kept the Argentine carrier in dock, along with most of the Argentine Navy. Of those ships and submarines which made sorties against the Task Force, the British submarines prowled for Argentine ships outside the Total Exclusion Zone.

On 12th April, a 200-mile Maritime Exclusion Zone came into operation around the Falklands, this being changed to a Total Exclusion Zone on 30th April. Any Argentine vessels found within the zone were liable to be sunk without warning. The 26th April saw helicopters from the destroyer Antrim, the frigates Brilliant and Plymouth attack, damage and force the Argentinean submarine Santa Fe to run aground and surrender.

On the afternoon of the 1st May, H.M.S. Conqueror sighted the cruiser General Belgrano, a World War 2 US-built warship lacking sonar, and its escort of two Exocet-equipped destroyers, which were a pre-eminent threat to the task force. The 2nd of May saw the War Cabinet clear the Conqueror to remove the Belgrano from the theatre. H.M.S. Conqueror fired a pattern of torpedoes from around 2,000 yards and scored two hits. The Argentine cruiser sank rapidly thereafter, although her escort did try to sink the Conqueror with depth-charges they were unsuccessful. The loss of one of its most prestigious units probably caused the Argentine Navy to recall its other units, including their only aircraft carrier, the Veinticinco de Mayo to port.

Argentine submarines continued to pose a threat to the task force, but no successful attacks were carried out. Although some confusion during the landings did include sightings of possible torpedo tracks, no attacks were confirmed. The fleet's helicopters provided constant anti-submarine cover; a task for which they were designed with the Royal Navy's anti-submarine role being pre-eminent within NATO.

All Submarine images are curtsey of Andrew Arthur who runs H.M.S. Andrew, a virtual encyclopedia of the Royal Navy since the 1930's until today, and onwards..

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3 Para's Battle for Mount Longdon

With the weather closing in and resupply becoming a problem, the high ground of Mount Longdon was a key objective of 3 Commando Brigade's plan of advance. On the night of 11-12th June, having been under bombardment from the Argentine 155mm artillery, 3 Para were ordered to take it. The mountain was defended by B Company, 7 Infantry Regiment reinforced by specialist elements and snipers from 501 Company of the Argentine Special Force and from the Marines. Numerous minefields and bunkers also protected the feature. 120mm mortars, numerous machine guns and 105mm recoilless guns and anti-tank missiles supported the position. Each of the positions turned out to have been pre-registered as defensive fire targets and the feature was the linchpin of the Argentine defences of Port Stanley and they were prepared to fight long and hard to keep it.

The feature had to be taken piecemeal from the west, and the summit was such that only one company could fight along it at a time. Outflanking was not an option as a large minefield was to the south and known enemy positions were to the east on Wireless Ridge. The summit dominated the open ground around it for several thousand yards, increasing the risks of night movements. The reconnaissance patrols had surveyed the hill for nearly two weeks and were fairly certain of the locations of the antipersonnel mines. Two principle positions defended the mountain; on the east one was called Full back and on the west was Fly Half. The latter was an enemy command post and well defended, whereas Full Back was known to be heavily defended by machine guns and snipers. The northern side of the summit was code named Wing Forward and the start line for the attack, which also served as a report line, was called Free Kick. This was located on the forward edge of the forming up point, on the far bank of a stream that runs south to north onto the Murrel River.

The companies would move by independent routes under D Company patrol guides. A Company would take on Full Back, B Company was to attack Fly Half and C Company was in reserve. Fire support was provided by HMS Avenger and 79 Battery RA. The Battalion's own machine guns and mortars of the support company would establish two fire bases; one at the 300 foot contour west of the mountain and another at Free Kick. 2 Troop, 9 Parachute Squadron RE would provide engineer support. The sappers also provided defence for the 300 ft contour firebase by manning a .30in Browning machine gun, to neutralize a similar weapon operated by the Argentines on Two Sisters to the southwest.

The intention after the attack was to pass C Company through and onto Wireless Ridge, but proved impossible to do so as Tumbledown was not captured that night and dominated the ground and the ridge. The attack began at about 2100 hours and the approach required a four-hour long night infiltration march under a good moon, revealing the jagged nature of the feature and the extent to which it dominated the surrounding countryside. Major Mike Argue, B Company commander, altered his approach when one of the fire support groups cut the B Company column with the result that part of Five Platoon and Six Platoon lost contact with the rest for about 30 minutes. As a consequence of the lost time, Major Argue decide to approach the objective directly, traveling well south of the original route and well to the right of A Company. The picture on the left shows Support 
Company 3 para getting their brief to go on Mount Longdon, Major Dennison OC SP COY, is standing on the right giving the brief, on the floor is a rough model of Longdon, the tall thin man in the front is Cpt Tony Mason Anti Tanks.

The excellent night vision provided by the moon allowed the platoons to move closer to the rocks for better cover in the fight through. Three rifle platoons were formed with the Company HQ slightly to the left and rear. Six Platoon was on the right attacking from the southwest of the feature. Four and Five Platoons were to the west and northwest with Four Platoon on the left. Once the rocky ground was reached, Five Platoon fanned out and upwards into improved cover but Four Platoon were still 700 yards away from the first Argentine trenches and on low ground. At this point, the section commander of Four Platoon stepped on an anti-personnel mine and received serious leg injuries, losing the element of surprise. The Argentines responded with mortar, artillery and machine gun fire, which fortunately was somewhat inaccurate. Five Platoon was in good cover behind the rocks and Four Platoon raced forward through the minefield to close the enemy. Six Platoon made contact at the same time, having occupied Fly Half without any fighting, but having grenaded a number of bunkers on their way through. In the dark they missed a bunker and the enemy within opened fire in the Platoon's rear inflicting some dead and wounded before they were dealt with.

Six Platoon now advanced through Fly Half and came under accurate fire suffering eight casualties, four of them fatal. The Platoon commander asked to be allowed to pause to reorganize and treat the wounded. This was granted but he was informed that he might have to move forward to support Four and Five Platoons with fire support. Four Platoon had moved up on the left of Five Platoon and one of its sections had become intermingled with the other platoon for a while. Five Platoon came under heavy fire from Argentine machine guns as they advanced up the hill. A GPMG team was pushed farther up the rock face to fire into the enemy positions and the Argentine GPMG was taken out with 66mm LAWs and 84mm MAW fire. Enemy fire now came from the 0.50in Browning further east and was dealt with by a section attack. The gun group gave covering fire as Privates Gough and Grey charged forward and grenaded the position. At this time Four Platoon was still to Five's left and slightly to the rear but was engaging targets to Five's east and above Five's forward elements.

The two platoons arrived at an area forward of the summit of Fly Half where the rock ridges started to break up and the ground began to slope away to the east, while the Full Back feature could be seen in the distance. Both platoons came under fire immediately. Their immediate problem was a well-sited platoon position reinforced with at least two FN MAG 7.62 GPMGs, a 105mm Recoilless gun and a 0.50in heavy machine gun. The position also had a number of snipers equipped with passive night sights. The commander of Four Platoon had been hit in the thigh in the initial burst of fire and the signaller of that platoon had been hit in the mouth. They continued to fire from their position and the signallers carried on transmitting until relieved some time later. It was while attempting to take out the heavy machine gun that Sergeant Ian McKay VC was killed. McKay and his team managed to reduce the enemy resistance but failed to neutralize the gun.

From the start of the advance, the artillery guns had been firing on recorded targets from Fullback while the guns and mortars had been pounding the targets throughout the action with rounds landing sometimes only 50 yards away from their own troops. The Battalion commander had also arrived by this time and had brought a fire support group under Major Peter Dennison, which had occupied a position on the summit of Mount Longdon and was bringing down fire on the enemy further east along the ridge.

B Company HQ was in an OP overlooking the enemy position and was laying heavy automatic fire on them. Everyone available plus artillery and mortars provided covering fire for the withdrawal from contact of the two platoons. The casualties were recovered and one fatality was sustained during the withdrawal as well as several minor casualties, with the withdrawal supervised by the company sergeant major.

A left flanking attack was mounted on the 50-cal position supported by machine gun fire from the summit of the mountain and mortar and artillery fire. Four and Five Platoons were merged into a composite force and accompanied by a small group from Company HQ, they approached along the route just used for the withdrawal as this was known to be clear of mines. They moved up the ridge to the north and waited while the final fire for effect hit the enemy positions. As the artillery moved east, the composite force moved forward and immediately came under fire from point blank range, having only gone some 30 yards. The muzzle flashes could be seen by company HQ but not the Platoon. The commander ordered the artillery to fire a 66mm round at the position to identify the target. The Platoon commander was still not sure where the fire was coming from and extracted himself and his radio operator while being covered by his rear section throwing grenades, which silenced the position. No more fire came from the position, so the Platoon commander and a rifleman both fired 66mm LAWs into the position and ran forward firing their rifles. Three enemy dead were found immediately and more after first light.

The 50-cal had been quiet for some time and it was hoped it had been neutralized. As B Company left cover to move forward they came under fire from two flanks, one from a position further east than the 50-cal and the other from the northeast where a number of enemy trenches were known to be. It was decided to move back and up onto the ridge and try and come at the enemy from behind. As this move was being carried out more fire came down, causing three more wounded. B Company's numbers were now critical and it was decided to pass A Company through to continue the action eastwards.

A Company approached their objective from the north, coming under increasingly accurate fire from the Argentine positions at the east of the feature due to a lack of cover. They moved forward to a series of peat banks with One Platoon to the left and Two Platoon on the right. Tac HQ was behind One Platoon and Company HQ to the left and rear. Three Platoon was on the right rear. Seeking the peat banks cost the Platoons their first casualties. The initial Argentine fire had been into planned defensive position and soon began to adjust to indirect fire back onto A Company and C Company positions. A Company could not move forward across the very open ground without sustaining more casualties from the accurate machine gun and sniper fire from the very high ground to their front. A Company pulled back and moved round to the western end of the mountain, passing back through B Company to assault Full Back from the west.

B Company's attack had established that outflanking the Argentines from the north would be too costly. A Company decided to attack along the ridge and Company HQ Support Group moved forward to position their GPMGs to cover the advance. The Forward Observation Officer began to call down artillery fire on the enemy positions. The Platoons moved across the ridge crawling on their stomachs towards the Argentine positions. The advance was slow and under accurate enemy fire. The lead section had to use all their own and the following sections, 66mm LAWs and grenades despite the covering fire as they moved forward. As the third section of the leading platoon crossed the crest, the enemy began to withdraw. As One Platoon followed Two Platoon over the crest the supporting fire stopped to prevent friendly fire casualties. The Two Platoon fixed bayonets and proceeded to clear the Argentines with bullet, grenade and bayonet. As the Platoons advanced more of the enemy withdrew and the support groups engaged these.

After a ten-hour action, Mount Longdon was in British hands. Daybreak brought a heavy mist that shrouded the mountain from Argentine guns as the Companies were reorganizing on the mountain. The cost of victory had been high, as the Paras had lost 23 killed and 47 wounded, 8 being killed in the actual battle and the rest during the following 36 hours of shelling. The Argentine casualties had been much higher. The mist later cleared and Argentine guns claimed six more lives and many wounded on Mount Longdon. The picture on the right shows Lance-Corporal James being lifted from 3 Paras forward aid post at the base of Longdon. The 3rd Parachute Battalion suffered the most losses for a single unit lost with 23 killed during the Battle of Mount Longdon and two days of shelling. 

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" Troops Out "

The San Carlos Landings

On the 13th of May Brigadier Julian Thompson, commander of the 3rd Commando Brigade, gave his first briefing on "Operation Sutton", the code name given for the first stage of the repossession of the Falkland Islands. The commanding officers and their staffs of the various units were all in attendance. The briefing was held in the wardroom of H.M.S. Fearless, which along with other ships of the Task Force was steaming south towards the Islands. Thompson stood before his officers and simply said, " Gentleman, Orders".

The briefing started with Major Southby-Tailyour RM. giving a short briefing on the terrain the battalion commanders could expect to find on the Falkland Islands. Southby-Tailyour had commanded NP 8901 from 1977 to 1979. NP 8901 was the small Royal Marine detachment, which had been the unit stationed on the Falklands before the Argentine invasion. Southby-Tailyour had spent many hours exploring the Islands from a small boat during his posting to NP 8901 and had gathered crucial information about the lay of the land. He had mapped every major bay on the Falkland Islands 10,000-mile coastline placing the information in a 126-page notebook. Thompson had asked Southby-Tailyour to hand over the notebook to his staff before leaving the UK, but Southby-Tailyour refused to do so unless he was allowed to accompany the Task Force. Thompson made sure Southby-Tailyour was part of his planning staff before 3 Commando sailed south. Southby-Tailyour had been instrumental in choosing the location of the landing of troops on the Islands. The location picked by Thompson and his planners was San Carlos on East Falkland.

After Southby-Tailyour's briefing, Thompson's Intelligence Officer, Captain Rowe, gave a briefing on the known 
locations and strength of the Argentine troops on the Islands. Next Thompson's Chief of staff, Major Chester, gave all the officers present a briefing on the air and naval forces that would be available during the landings. The mastermind of the whole amphibious landing was Commander Clapp RN.

After these briefings Thompson stood up and  gave the main briefing for the landing of 3 Commando at San Carlos. "Mission. To land at Port San Carlos, San Carlos and Ajax Bay to establish a beachhead for mounting offensive operations leading to the recapture of the Falkland Islands". He then repeated what he had just stated and continued "Design for battle, a silent night attack by landing craft with the objective of securing all high ground by first light". Thompson then addressed each of his unit commanders individually, regarding their units' role in the landings. The plans were thus:

The SBS would be the first in to secure the landing beaches and mark them for the approaching landing craft.

First Wave 
would consist of 40 and 45 Commandos. 40 would land on "Blue Beach" at San Carlos from H.M.S. Canberra 
while 45 would land on "Red Beach" at Ajax Bay from Stromness

Second Wave 
would consist of the 2nd and 3rd Parachute Battalions. 2 Para would come ashore from H.M.S. Norland and 
pass through 45 to secure Sussex Mountain and resist any Argentine attempt to attack the beachhead from Goose Green. 3 Para would come ashore from H.M.S. Canberra and land on "Green Beach" and secure Port San Carlos.

42 Commando would act as a floating reserve aboard H.M.S. Canberra.

D Squadron of the SAS would cause a diversion for the landing by flying ashore from H.M.S. Intrepid and using noise and heavy fire power would try to convince "Task force Mercedes" (the Argentine troops stationed at Goose Green) that they were being attacked by a regiment, keeping the Argentines occupied while the landings took place.

Various other members of Thompson's staff then took over the briefing to give detailed instruction on logistics 
and landing craft arrangements. Thompson then closed the briefing by reminding his officers that in the event of an opposed landing, the killed and wounded were to be left, otherwise the momentum of the assault would be lost. He went on to say, " May I remind you that this will be no picnic. Good Luck and stay flexible" With that the two hour long briefing ended. The only thing Thompson had not shared with his officers was the date and time of the landings.

By the next morning Thompson's plans were out the window. During the night Northwood (the operations centre for the task force in England) intercepted an Argentine radio signal from "EC Hermes" The signal originated from Port San Carlos. Thompson's staff was worried by this information. What was EC Hermes? Had the Argentines discovered the location of the British landings? Before now British Intelligence had thought that San Carlos was unoccupied by the Argentines. A 4-man SBS team had been active in the San Carlos area since May the 1st and reported no signs of Argentine activity. Captain Rod Bell came up with the answers. Bell was one of 3 Commando Brigade's Spanish interpreters. He had been raised in Costa Rica and Spanish was his first language. Bell suggested that EC stood for "Equipo Combate" or Combat Team, which would be no more than a company in strength.

Combat Team Eagle (EC Hermes) was in fact only platoon strength. It was commanded by 1st Lieutenant Carlos Esteban of the 25th Infantry Regiment. His unit consisted of 60 men. Esteban had been ordered to set up an OP overlooking San Carlos Water to observe any attempt by the British to land there. Combat Team Eagle had been flown into the San Carlos area by helicopter from Goose Green on the 14th of May. Their arrival was confirmed later in the day by a SBS sergeant making a covert recon of the landing beaches. Esteban made his headquarters at Port San Carlos and sent 20 men under 2nd Lieutenant Roberto Oscar Reyes to Fanning Head to set up an OP over looking San Carlos Water. This group of Argentineans became known as 'The Fanning Head Mob". They were armed with an 81 mm mortar and 105 mm recoilless rifle. Reyes and his 'Fanning Head Mob' were to remain a thorn in the side of the British bridgehead for the next week. Reyes had also made himself known to the civilian population at San Carlos when he struck the manager of the settlement, Alan Miller, in the face with the butt of his pistol. See Map

Unknowingly, Esteban had put a spanner in the works and Thompson and his staff had to re-think their plan. Over night they re-wrote the plans to "Operation Sutton" The new plan was as follows.

3 SBS would be put ashore well before the main invasion to deal with the 'Fanning Head Mob'.

D squadron SAS would stick to their original role of keeping  "Task force Mercedes" (the Argentine troops 
stationed at Goose Green) occupied.

Thompson now issued his new orders to his field commanders and set the date for D-Day as Friday the 21st of May. H-Hour would be 3.30am local time. The next day 3 Para suffered the unpleasant experience of being transferred by landing craft from H.M.S. Canberra to the assault ship H.M.S. Intrepid. 40 Commando also transferred from H.M.S. Canberra to H.M.S. Fearless. The troops had to lower themselves by rope from a side door on H.M.S. Canberra into the swaying landing craft below. Each man had to time the moment just right because one moment the landing craft would be just 3 feet away; the next it might be 15 feet away. One Royal Marine got it wrong and fell into the sea; Luckily he was quickly plucked out of the cold water unharmed.

Just after midnight 3,000 troops aboard a fleet of eleven ships entered the narrows guarding San Carlos Water. H.M.S. Antrim launched its Wessex helicopter to make a quick reconnaissance of what the 'Fanning Head Mob' was up to. The Wessex (in fact the same aircraft that had played a major roll in the re-taking of South Georgia) was fitted with a thermal image camera. After a quick sweep of San Carlos the Wessex returned to H.M.S. Antrim and the SBS viewed the videotape from the thermal image camera. Several clusters of what looked like bright glow-worms were observed, giving the exact location of the Argentines. The SBS set off to deal with them. Captain Bell (one of 3 Commando Brigade's Spanish interpreters) accompanied them armed with a battery driven loudspeaker he had found aboard H.M.S. Antrim. The plan was for Bell to try and persuade the Argentines to surrender without blood being spilled.

Meanwhile the other landing ship H.M.S. Intrepid anchored and her four LCUs (Tango 1, 2, 3 and 4) left the dock and headed for H.M.S. Norland to pick up 2 Para. Because of the enforced radio silence the LCUs had a hard time locating H.M.S. Norland amongst the ships in San Carlos Water. Colour Sergeant Davies at the helm of the leading LCU, Tango 1, had to identify each ship with shielded signal lamp before he located H.M.S. Norland. While the other LCUs circled waiting their turn, Davis pulled along side H.M.S. Norland only to find that there were no mooring points for the LCUs to use. The helmsmen had to constantly keep station alongside H.M.S. Norland as the Paras climbed down several ten-foot rope ladders onto the LCUs. Because of their late arrival at Ascension Island 2 Para had missed out on the rehearsals for this type of troop transfer. Now here they were in the dark, loaded down with equipment, trying to do something they never expected to have to do and on top of all that their mortal enemies, the Marines, were in charge. It took time and a lot of swearing but 2 Para started to slowly board the LCUs. One Para fell into a LCU breaking his pelvis.

The plan had been for 2 Para's boats to cross the start line at 1.45am but due to the embarkation problems on H.M.S. Norland, Thompson slipped the schedule forward by one hour. After what seemed like an age, the last LCU, Tango 4 commanded by Csgt Kiwi Sherrin ( Second coxn Cpl Mick Angel ), pulled along side H.M.S. Norland to embark the last of 2 Para. While this was happening, the other three LCUs circled waiting for Tango 4 before heading for the beaches. Southby-Tailyour, whose task was to guide the landing craft in, located Col. "H" Jones, 2 Paras CO, onboard Tango 1, which was carrying B Company. Southby-Tailyour suggested to Jones that if they left now without Tango 4 and steamed at full speed with the other three LCUs they would be able to beach only forty minutes behind H-hour. Jones replied, "let's go"

Meanwhile the SBS were having their own problems. The Sea King aboard H.M.S. Antrim, which was going to fly the SBS in, was going nowhere. The aircraft could not lift off because of the weight of all the gear the SBS wanted to take with them. A quick reorganization of men and equipment had to take place before the load was lightened. The pilots told the SBS that it would still take four lifts to get all 35 men and their equipment to the drop off point, which was only 10 minutes flying time from H.M.S. Antrim. Eventually the SBS were landed 2,500 meters from their target. Equipment was sorted and the men headed in single file towards Fanning Head. See Map

The noise of the helicopters depositing the SBS alerted the 'Fanning Head Mob' and one of the sentries awoke Lt. Reyes saying that something was happening in the bay. Reyes ordered the recoilless rifle to be fired into San Carlos Water, but there was no reaction. He then radioed Esteban at Port San Carlos telling him that there was possible British activity in San Carlos. After speaking to Esteban, Reyes went back to sleep.

The march to Fanning Head was proving to be hard going for the SBS and by 2.15 they were still 1,000 yards short of their objective. Captain Hugh McManners radioed H.M.S. Antrim to open fire on Fanning Head with her 4.5 main gun. Unfortunately the weapon refused to cooperate so the SBS opened fire with their 60 mm mortar. At 4.30 am H.M.S. Antrim informed McManners that the 4.5 was now operational again. He ordered twenty air bursts to be laid over the Argentineans. Reyes was fully awake by now and after failing to contact Esteban, decided to abandon the OP. McManners spotted them as they moved towards Partridge Valley. The SBS formed a fire line and opened up on the Argentines with everything they had. Some of the Argentines were killed before McManners ordered cease-fire and handed command over to Captain Bell and his loudspeaker. Bell cleared his throat and began to speak into the loudspeaker, but nothing came out. The batteries were dead. Throwing the loudspeaker aside in disgust Bell shouted as hard as he could in Spanish telling the Argentines to surrender. Four of the Argentines raised their hands but Reyes and the rest of his men slipped into the darkness back towards Fanning Head were they opened fire on the SBS with a MAG. McManners ordered more shelling from H.M.S. Antrim, which forced four more Argentines to surrender. Reyes now moved further away from Fanning Head taking what was left of his platoon with him. Bell and some of the SBS gave chase but lost them in the darkness.

The troops heading towards the beaches witnessed the firefight going on at Fanning Head as they rowed towards the shore. 2 Para were having a rough time in the LCUs that "H" Jones had packed with as many men as he could. One soldier accidentally discharged his weapon wounding another Para in the foot. As Southby-Tailyour approached "Blue Beach 2" he started looking for the prearranged signal from the SBS who had gone in ahead to secure the beach. The SBS were to use a red light flashing pre-arranged signals in Morse such as:

Alpha: Beach safe 
Bravo: Be careful 
Charlie: enemy on beach 
No light at all: Cock up or enemy on beach.

Southby-Tailyour searched the landing beach but could see no light at all. Did this mean the enemy was waiting for them, or had the SBS not made it to the right beach? Southby-Tailyour walked up to the bridge of Tango 1 to speak to "H" Jones about his problem, but found that Jones had already made his decision for him. Jones said although he could not see the SBS, the enemy were nowhere to be seen. There fore he gave the order, "Prepare to beach" Colour Sergeant Davies drove Tango 1 onto the beach, lowered the ramp and shouted, "Troops out" Nobody moved. He shouted again " Troops out ". Still nobody moved. The order, "troops out" would be understood by a Royal Marine but to a Para it means nothing. Realizing what the trouble was, a Para officer screamed, "GO" See Map

At 4.30am local time B Company 2 Para stormed ashore at "Blue Beach 1". The British had returned to the 
Falklands. B Company's CO, Major John Crossland, was one of the first ashore. As he walked ashore he was confronted by a member of the SBS saying, "Who the hell are you?" 
"2 Para, who the bloody hell are you?" 
"3 SBS .We thought you were coming on the 24th." 
This did not go down well with Crossland, nor did it improve relationships between the Paras and the Marines.

Tangos 1, 2 and 3 disgorged their troops onto "Blue Beach 2". Tango 4 soon arrived after steaming at full speed from H.M.S. Norland. There was much confusion on the beach as the troops poured shore and were separated from their units. Jones was so angry about the delay in getting ashore that he broke radio silence and ordered his company commanders to get the Battalion sorted out. The Paras soon sorted themselves out and C Company led the way as the Battalion headed towards Sussex Mountain. See Map

40 Commando, who had been waiting offshore, now headed towards "Blue Beach 2". The Marines landed without any problems and C Company secured San Carlos settlement and raised the Union Jack flag. The Marines found 30 Islanders at the settlement. A and B Companies checked out the area to their front before climbing Verde Mountain to establish defensive positions on the reverse slope, while C Company checked the area of the settlement. Lt Col. Hunt and Capt. A. Pillar knocked on the door of Mr. P. Short to announce their arrival. The two officers were somewhat surprised when Mr. Short opened the door and said very calmly, "Oh! You're here. We wondered when you were going to come".

The Recce Troop moved forward to establish OPs on Verde Mountain but found progress slow due to their heavy loads and difficult terrain. The SAS diversion at Darwin had proved effective and the San Carlos Landings continued undisturbed. See Map

45 Commando was put ashore at Ajax Bay and 3 Para at the Port San Carlos settlement. Darkness gave way to clear blue skies as the amphibious ships moved into San Carlos Water while everything was going to plan. The Rapier air defence systems started to come ashore with the 105 mm light artillery batteries. A dawn bombardment of the Goose Green airstrip prevented Argentine Puccara aircraft from taking off, but a lone Aermacchi, bravely flown by Lieutenant Guillermo Crippa from Port Stanley, strafed H.M.S. Argonaut inflicting casualties among the men on the upper deck, one of whom lost an eye. Every gun and missile now opened up on Crippa's aircraft as he calmly flew the length of the bay counting the Task Force's ships. He then banked and returned unharmed to Port Stanley. Crippa was awarded Argentina's highest award for gallantry.

Combat Team Eagle at Port San Carlos was retreating in front of 3 Para. Some Argentineans managed to evade capture for the next few days. The Argentine Air Force started to retaliate against the task force at about 0900 hrs, with a series of sorties flown from Stanley and long-range sorties from the mainland. H.M.S. Ardent and H.M.S. Argonaut were singled out for attack with both being badly damaged. The Ardent had to be abandoned, and the Argonaut, with two 1,000 lb unexploded bombs aboard, was towed into San Carlos Water.

2nd Lieutenant Reyes and what remained of the 'Fanning Head Mob' were still at large in the area and soon pulled off the only Argentine success of the day. A Sea King helicopter, carrying Rapier missiles and escorted by a light Gazelle helicopter armed with a pintle-mounted machine gun and pod mounted SNEB rockets, flew straight over Reyes party as they fled the area. The Argentines opened fire and heavy accurate machine gun fire struck the Gazelle, mortally wounding her pilot Sergeant Andy Evans. Even so, he managed to turn away from the fire and ditch in the water.  The two crewmen were thrown from the aircraft when it hit the water. As they struggled in the water, the same Argentines who had shot the helicopter down opened fire on the two crewmen in the water, despite Reyes ordering them to cease-fire.  The Argentine troops continued to fire on the two helpless men struggling in the water for 15 minutes. When the shooting stopped Sergeant Ed Chandlish, managed to drag Evans ashore, where he died in his arms. The Sea King they were escorting had managed to avoid the fire.

Minutes later a second Gazelle, unaware of the peril ahead, followed the same route and was raked by machine gun fire from below. The helicopter crashed to the ground in flames. When rescuers dragged the crew, Lt. Ken France and Lance Corporal Pat Griffin, from the burning wreckage they found them dead. Surgeon Commander Rick Jolly arrived at the crash site soon after in a Wessex from H.M.S. Canberra. There was nothing he could do for France or Griffin, but he decided to return the bodies of the two men back to the Task Force, which was against orders, but he did so mainly out of respect. That evening aboard the landing ship Sir Galahad, the Brigade Air Squadron held a memorial service for their three dead colleagues. See Map

This shooting of unarmed men in the water had a marked effect on the British troops in the Task Force. Reyes and his party made it back to Goose Green four days later although stragglers from the 'Fanning Head Mob' were still being rounded up around the San Carlos area a week after the landings.

After enduring the cramped conditions aboard H.M.S. Intrepid, 3 Para had landed safely, if not a little wet at "Green Beach". As the lead LCU neared the beach, the Paras watched in horror as the Royal Marine Coxswain tested the depth of the water with a white stick. This brought the comment from one Para, "F### me, he's bloody blind"! Some of the LCUs were unable to get right in and some of 3 Para ended up getting wet as they waded ashore. These men claimed that from that moment until the end of the war, their feet never fully dried out. See Map

Col. Hew Pike of 3 Para was ordered by Thompson to clear the area of any remaining members of Combat Team Eagle. Pike sent out patrols from his A and C Companies to hunt down the Argentines. Sadly this brought about the first "Blue on Blue" incident of the campaign when A Company opened fire on a group of figures in the dark who had failed to respond to a challenge. They poured small arms fire into what they thought was the enemy and even called for 105 mm fire support. Two Scimitars of the Blues and Royals opened up with their 30 mm cannon as well. At 3 Para HQ Pike, who was listening to the reports, suddenly realized that two of his companies were firing at each other and ordered an immediate cease-fire. By then the firefight had been going on for 62 minutes. The enemy turned out to be a patrol from C Company commanded by Lieutenant Peter Osbourn.  Two of his Toms (Paras) lay badly wounded. Col. Pike flew in a helicopter to the contact area and was nearly killed when the Sea King he was flying in crashed. 3 Para sorted themselves out and managed to round up what was left of Combat Team Eagle over the next few days. The picture on the right shows a captured NCO from Combat Team Eagle being escorted by Sergeant Watson of  3 Para. The Argentine NCO is still wearing a Royal Marine jersey that he had looted from Moody Brook Barracks in Port Stanley.

Combat Team Eagle was not the only Argentine unit in the area that week. On May the 23rd Lieutenant Commander Dante Camilettie and ten Argentine Marines had landed by helicopter on Chata Hill. Their task was to destroy British anti-aircraft defences on Mount Usborne. Camilettie and his Marines laid up for one day trying to observe the British but saw nothing. He then moved his patrol nearer to San Carlos. Camilettie spread his men out around the beachhead and installed himself on Mount Verde. From here he observed the British beachhead and reported back to Stanley all he saw, until he was captured, while hiding under a rock, by a patrol from 40 Commando.  The Royal Marines "invited" Camilettie back to 3rd Commando Brigade HQ to have a little chat about what he was doing in the hills.

May 22nd was clear and fine over the Falklands and no Argentine sorties were flown from Goose Green or Stanley. 3rd Commando Brigade took full advantage of this break to establish a Brigade support area with hundreds of tons of ammunition and stores ferried ashore and a casualty clearing station was set up in a disused mutton factory. Responsibility for the defence of the Rapier battery was given to A Company on Lookout Hill. The landings had been achieved. Now for the Breakout!

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Mountain and Arctic Warfare Cadre

The Battle for Top Malo House

A specialized training unit of the Royal Marines was formed from the Cliff Assault Wing of the 3 Commando Brigade from the cadre normally trained in winter Warfare. These specialists were highly skilled in military skiing and Arctic survival techniques. They were experts in deep penetration patrolling in adverse conditions, particularly in mountainous terrain. Brigadier Thompson was to use the cadre as the Brigade reconnaissance troop where they became a vital tactical reserve and were to fight the only daylight action against Argentinean Special Forces at Top Malo House.

Captain Boswell RM. and nineteen of his men of the M and AW Cadre were about to undertake a task that had originated from a report made on May 27th by a four man patrol from the cadre, sitting on Bull Hill. They had been in position since D-Day, 21st May, one of a number of small patrols that were the eyes and ears of the Commando Brigade. The four man patrol on Bull Hill, well forward on the route to Teal and Stanley, reported back to say that this may be their last message because two Argentine UH-1 helicopters were hovering over the OP. Eventually, and to the relief of the patrol, the UH-1s lifted and hovered and then flew in the direction of Mount Simon.

The Sgt. i/c of the patrol reckoned that they had probably deposited troops of the Argentine Special Forces on the lower slopes of Mount Simon. The message sent back to Commando Brigade Headquarters alerted the Brigade of the threat of Argentine Special Forces sitting on the high ground to the approaches of Teal Inlet and beyond. The Commando Brigade was about to move forwards to Teal Inlet, so this threat to their security must be eliminated. Boswell was to undertake this task with his men. On the evening of 30th May he received a message from one of the patrols in an OP on the lower slopes of Mount Simon, that they had just seen two UH-Is deposit a patrol of sixteen men at Top Malo house 400 meters from their position and that they had heard several other helicopters in the vicinity. It was this Argentine Special Forces patrol that Boswell was told to eliminate. He planned to arrive by helicopter about one hour before first light at a landing site about 1,000 meters away and in dead ground from Top Malo House, he would approach in the darkness and assault at dawn.

In a helicopter from the 846 Naval Air Squadron, the nineteen men piled into the helicopter with their rucksacks heavily loaded with supplies and ammunition to last for a week in the field without re-supply. Overloaded, the helicopter took off to deposit the assault force on exactly the right spot after a 45 kilometre flight, only possible by skilful flying and typical of the pilots and aircrew of the 846 Naval Air Squadron. The assault force set off and moved 1,000 meters away. A seven man fire group moved off to the left about 150 meters from Top Malo House, from where they would support the twelve man assault group led by Boswell. As Boswell approached the house he called the section commanders to him for a final check. As they lay looking at the target, Boswell realized that their dark uniforms on the snow covered ground would be a give-away to an alert sentry, and being Special Forces the enemy would surely have sentries out. The whole assault group crawled forward, only too conscious that the ground over which they were moving was overlooked by a window in the upper floor of the building.

When Boswell judged they were close enough to the house and in full view of their support fire group, he gave the order 'fix bayonets'. Boswell fired a green mini-flare, the signal for the fire group to fire six 66 mm light anti-armour rockets at the house. As the first rocket was fired, an Argentine sentry moved to the window on the upper floor. A Corporal, armed with a sniper rifle, shot him. As the 66 mm rockets slammed into the house it burst into flames; Boswell and the assault group charged forward, halted, fired two 66s into the house and charged again. The enemy ran from the house into a small streambed about 50 meters away, firing as they ran. One Marine Sergeant fell, hit through the shoulder, and then a Corporal fell hit through the chest. The ammunition stacked in the house exploded as the assault group ran forward and the smoke from the burning building shielded them from the enemy lying in the stream firing at them. The firefight went on for a few minutes as the assault group worked their way towards the enemy. The officer commanding the Argentine force tried to run off and was killed by two 40mm rounds fired from M79 grenade launchers. The Argentines stood up and threw away their weapons. It was over.

Five Argentines had been killed, seven wounded and the remaining five were taken prisoner. The British had three wounded. The whole operation had been a brilliant success by good field craft, good planning, and excellent flying by the pilot from 846. Unknown to the British the assault had been watched by two other Argentine OPs who, having seen the treatment meted out to their comrades, decided to call it a day. One OP stationed on the summit of Mount Simon walked into Teal Inlet where 45 Commando picked them up. The other group walked towards Lower Malo House and surrendered to 3 Para.

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With most of 5 Infantry Brigade entrenched in the Bluff Cove-Fitzroy area on 9th June, Brigadier Tony Wilson assembled the battalion commanders to plan the Brigade's part in the advance on Port Stanley. 3 Commando Brigade would attack Two Sisters and Mount Harriet, and 3 Para would take on Mount Longdon. 5 Brigade was assigned Mount Tumbledown, Mount William, Wireless Ridge and Sapper Hill. Wilson's first idea was for the Brigade to attack on the 12th June, with 2 Para attacking Wireless Ridge and the Ghurkhas undertaking active patrols on Mount Tumbledown and Mount William on the same night as 3 Commando attacked. The Scots Guards, with a company of Ghurkhas under command, would move in step with 3 Commando Brigade, covering their south flank. If Tumbledown and William did not fall to the Ghurkhas, the Scots Guards would go in at first light on 12th or 13th June. The Welsh Guards were down to only two effective companies and were intended to be kept in reserve by Brigadier Wilson.

A recce platoon of 2nd Btn, Scots Guards, was forward of Bluff Cove at a covert patrol base during the conference, and on his return, Lt-Col. Mike Scott recalled the platoon. Before it could withdraw they were brought under mortar and small arms fire.

Platoon Sergeant Allum gave the order to pull out, under intense fire, which wounded three men including Sergeant Allum. The casualties were taken to an emergency rendezvous and were lifted by helicopter direct to the main dressing station in Ajax Bay. The remainder of the platoon picked their way through a minefield that barred their retreat, the platoon then got a ride to Bluff Cove, courtesy of Scimitars and Scorpions of the Blues and Royals Troop, which was with 5 Brigade. The action showed that the Argentines were well prepared to face any threat from the south.

This made Lt-Col. Scott unhappy with a southern attack on Tumbledown and in a planning meeting with his company commanders, supporting battery commander, adjutant and ops and intelligence officers, they came to the conclusion that southern attack, in daylight across the harsh ground of Tumbledown's southern slope, would be suicidal. Scott went back to Wilson and with Wilson's agreement changed plans, to attack Tumbledown from the flank at night, using positions already secured by the Commandos to the west.

The new plan was once Tumbledown had been taken, the Ghurkhas would assault Mount Williams, and then the Welsh guards would pass through and seize Sapper Hill.

Scott issued his orders on the afternoon of 10th June. The attack would be silent and mounted in three phases, each based on a company attack, with companies passing through one another until the Mountain was secured. Supporting fire would be in the form of close air support from Harriers, five batteries of 105mm light guns, the mortars of 42 Commando and the Welsh guards. Naval gunfire support would come from HMS Active and HMS Yarmouth. A diversionary attack was planned to precede the main assault and draw Argentine attention to the direct they expected the assault to come from, the south.

The attacks were now scheduled on the night of 12th June, the Scots Guards were to be airlifted to their assembly area west of Goat Ridge at 0800 hours that day, but no helicopters arrived. When Lt-Col. Scott went to Brigade headquarters he found out about 3 Commando's successes of the previous night. In view of the delay, his attack would be delayed to the following night. However, he was able to take his company commanders forward, by helicopter, and give them a good look at Tumbledown form Goat Ridge.

The following morning the helicopters arrived and the men were airlifted into position. Sangars were dug and the Argentines shelled the position for most of the day, although they only wounded one man. The platoon and section commanders got a good look at the objective during the day and at 1400 hours, Scott gave his final orders.

The initial estimate placed Argentine strength at a company occupying Tumbledown, probably well dug in. The battalion would advance down Goat Ridge in a line-ahead formation by companies, with G Company leading, followed by 'Left Flank' and then 'Right Flank'. G Company would take the most western part of Tumbledown, which was thought to have one Argentine platoon on it. 'Left Flank' would then pass through to deal with the next part of the Mount, and finally 'Right Flank' would seize the remainder. H-Hour was fixed for 2100 hours. Each man was in light order, leaving his rucksack in the assembly area, but six sleeping bags per company were carried to help casualties. The assault would be made wearing berets; the helmet would be carried, as it was awkward for difficult terrain, and would be donned for the close assault.

The diversionary attack started at 2030 hours. Major Richard Bethell commanded the attack with three four-man assault sections from the recce platoon and a fire support group from Battalion headquarters with A1 echelon, the battalion's immediate logistics element. In support were the Blues and Royals and two sappers, a forward observation officer, and mortar fire controller.

Signs of the enemy had been seen earlier, but now none were apparent. Bethell sent the Blues and Royals off towards Stanley to draw fire, the lead vehicle running over a mine, but luckily not sustaining any injuries to the crew and without attracting the attention of the Argentines. A sangar was spotted as the assault group advanced. The fire support group took up position and the assault group closed in. They spotted further sangars and snoring could be heard. The group split up to deal with these dugouts and came under heavy fire. Two men were killed immediately and four more wounded. After two hours' hard fighting, the position was eventually secured and then came the withdrawal.

Major Bethell, and the piper with him, was providing covering fire for the withdrawal and both were wounded by grenade shrapnel. Four more men were badly wounded in a minefield. Argentine artillery opened fire. It had little effect as the shells buried themselves deep in the soft peat. The dead had to be abandoned and the party reached the starting point just after midnight, in time to see Tumbledown lit up by artillery fire and 0.5in tracers form Mount Harriet.

G Company advanced in two parallel columns for the three kilometres from the start line to their objective. Despite sporadic snow flurries, artillery, and mortar fire, as well as star shells, they managed to get onto their objective, only to find that the Argentines had abandoned it, but they heard Spanish being spoken further up the hill and remained undetected. The 'Left Flank' passed through G Company at 2230 hours and G Company provided supporting fire. This drew mortar and artillery fire onto their positions and they suffered some casualties. Meanwhile, the two platoons of 'Left Flank' closed with the enemy.

The right-hand platoon came under accurate artillery and machine gun fire and began to take casualties, while the left-hand platoon under Second Lieutenant James Stuart, had problems negotiating the rocks. His platoon sergeant, and one other man, was killed and two more were wounded including the company sergeant major. Both platoons tried to dislodge the enemy with mortar fire, grenades launchers, and light anti-tank weapons but the Argentines, regulars of the 5th Marine Battalion, would not budge. The FOO and MFC called down fire but had problems getting it to fall in the right place.

The Company Commander, Major John Kiszely, spoke to Battalion headquarters just before 0230 hours and informed them he was going to lead a charge. He led his men in a fixed bayonet charge, overrunning the sangars and killing the enemy in tough fighting. Major Kiszely, himself, had a lucky escape when an enemy round lodged in his belt. The move forward, guarding the prisoners, and clearing out the sangars, saw most of Major Kiszely's men absorbed and he found himself on top of the mountain with only six men, three of whom were wounded. Major Kiszely had some anxious moments, but the Argentines did not counter-attack. The attack had taken seven hours hard fighting and had cost 'Left Flank' seven men killed and 18 wounded.

The enemy were still holding onto the last part of the Mountain, and at 0600 hours 'Right Flank' moved to deal with them. Major Simon Price planned to do a right flanking action with two platoons, the third to provide covering fire. He had only half an hour until daylight. There was no artillery support and little mortar fire.

He attacked with the leading sections, firing their anti-tank LAWs as they went. Ricochets off the rocks flew in all directions and the enemy returned heavy fire. The Guards did manage to secure a forward position, and many acts of bravery were recorded. By 0800 hours, the objective was secured with several Argentines killed and 14 captured. 'Right Flank' had lost five wounded, including Lt. Robert Lawrence, who was awarded the MC.

Tumbledown was a very tough nut to crack and a remarkable achievement for a battalion that two and a half months before had been on ceremonial duties in London.

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3rd April 1982 

Puma SA330l of CAB601 brought down by heavy small arms fire from Royal Marine party defending Grytviken South Georgia. 1st Lieutenant Alejandro Villagra piloting a Puma Helicopter lifted off from the Bahia Paraiso carrying another 15 argentine Marines to reinforce the seven already ashore. Villagra brought the Puma too close to Mount Hodges, and Mills gave his men the order to open fire. A hail of fire hit the Puma. Two Argentinean Marines  were instantly killed and several wounded, but Villagra and his co-pilot were amazingly unhurt and managed to stop the helicopter from dropping out of the sky. Both pilots managed to coax the smoking aircraft across the bay to the Hummocks were it crashed and rolled over on its side, injuring more Marines.

1st May 1982.

08.25 hours 
One Pucara of FAA Grupo3 destroyed and two other Pucara's damaged beyond repair at Goose Green after a bombing attack by three Harriers of No. 800 Squadron, flown by Lt-Cdr Frederiksen, Lt Hale and Lt McHarg RN. Lt Jukic was killed in the destroyed aircraft as he tried to take off.

1200 hours. 
Lt. Commander "Sharkey" Ward and Lt. M. Watson in Sea Harriers of No.801 Squadron on CAP engage three Turbo-Mentors. One is damaged by cannon fire from Ward's Aircraft.

1528 hours. 
No.801 Squadron CAP, Lt. S. Thomas and Flight Lt. P. Barton, engage two Mirages of FAA Grupo 8 in a turning fight. Flight Lt. Barton destroys one with a Sidewinder and the pilot, Lt Perona (I-015), managed to eject.  Lt. S. Thomas damages the other Mirage flown by Capt Cuerva. Cuerva try's to fly his damaged aircraft to Stanley Airfield. He is shot down and killed by Argentine AA over Stanley.

1640 hours 
A Dagger of FAA Grupo 6 is shot down by Flt Penfold fly a No 800 Sea Harrier over East Falkland using a Sidewinder. The pilot of the Dagger, Lt Ardiles is killed.

1647 hours. 
No.801 Squadron CAP (Lt-Commander M. Broadwater and Lt. W. Curtis) intercepts three Canberras 50 miles from H.M.S. Invincible. Lt. Curtis destroys one (B-110), B62 of FAA Grupo 2, with a Sidewinder. The Argentine crew, Lt. Ibanez and Gonzalez are seen to eject, but are never found.

These attacks inflicted the following damage: 
3 Daggers attack 3 ships in front of Stanley/Argentino, causing various degrees of damage to the ships

Official Argentine Sources state: 
May 1st: 
8:25 Jukic's plane(A-527) destroyed and pilot killed when trying to start the engines. Another Pucara(A-502) damaged but recovered (see below). No other Pucara damaged on the ground during this action. 
15:28 Garcia Cuerva's plane (I-019) was not hit by Thomas, as far as conversations I've had with members of the Argentine Air Force that saw his plane approaching and talked to him on the radio. He dropped his missile to lighten his plane when trying to land low on fuel after the air combat, Army gunners mistook him with a Harrier dropping a bomb and shot at him. Flew over the town shedding pieces and catching fire while other gunners joined the Army ones (that's what was seen by the townsfolk) before crashing. Even Thomas in the book by Hobson says that he did not see his missile explode or hit GC's plane. 
16:40 Ardiles (C-433) was flying alone in this mission and fought against 2 Sea Harriers. He was flying a Dagger (no radar)

9th May 1982. 
Two A-4C Skyhawks of FAA Grupo 4, flown by Lt Casco (C-313) and Lt. Farias (C-303),  did not return, presumed crashed in poor weather. Wreckage from one of the aircraft was later found on South Jason Island.

H.M.S. Coventry destroys Puma, SA330L of CAB 601, while flying over Choiseul sound with Sea Dart SAM at a range of over 10 miles. All three crew members are killed.

Official Argentine Sources state: 
May 9th: 
Yes, they crashed in bad weather. According to recent information, the 2nd plane has been found in shallow waters in the same island (South Jason). While trying to defuse the bomb of Casco's plane, a fire caused by the explosion burnt 90% of the island.

12th May 1982. 
1244 hours. 

Four A-4B Skyhawks of FAA Grupo 4,  attack H.M.S. Brilliant and H.M.S. Glasgow, 15 miles south of Port Stanley. Brilliant destroys two with Seawolf missiles and a third crashes into the sea while trying to evade missile. All three pilots, Lt Bustos(C-246), Lt Ibarlucea(C-208) and Lt Nivoli(C-206) are killed.

1304 hours. 
One A-4B Skyhawk, in a group of four, destroyed by Argentine anti-aircraft fire at Goose Green after attacking HMS Glasgow and HMS Brilliant. Pilot, Lt Gavazzi (C-248), is  killed.

Official Argentine Sources state: 
May 12th: 
13:04 hs. HMS Glasgow was damaged and retired from the Theater

14-15 May. 
Six Pucaras, four Turbo-Mentors and a Skyvan transport lost, destroyed by the SAS during a raid on the Pebble Island airstrip.

Official Argentine Sources state: 
14-15th: 
2 destroyed, 4 damaged but not recovered (see details below) 
Pucara A-502 and 520 destroyed, damaged 523, 529, 552 and 556.

21st May 1982.

08.00 hours 
Chinook CH-47c of CAB 601 destroyed on the ground near Mount Kent by Flt Lt. Hare RAF. Flying a Harrier GR3. 
Hare destroyed the Chinook using his 30mm cannon. In the same attack Sqn Ldr Pook badly  damaged a Puma ( SA 330L ) of CAB 601  also on the ground near Mount Kent, again using his GR3s 30mm cannon. Pook returned to finish the job of on the 26th of May, destroying the helicopter.

0840 hours. 

Pucara of FAA Grupo 6 shot down by Stinger SAM near San Carlos. Pilot, Captain Jorge Benitez (A-531),  ejects and walks back to Goose Green, which was still in Argentine hands at this time. The Stinger was fired by a senior NCO of D Squadron Air Troop SAS. The shot turned out to be a lucky one because the operator of the weapon had had no training on the Stinger before. The Stingers had been supplied to the SAS by the United States Government. Staff Sergeant O'Connor of the SAS had been trained on the weapon and it was intended that he would teach other troopers how to use the weapon. Sadly O'Connor was killed along with 21 others when the Sea king he was aboard crashed into the sea on the 19th of May. He was carrying all the Stinger training manuals at the time. The pilot of the Pucara, Capt. Benitez, ejected safely from the aircraft.

0930 hours. 

Three Mirage Daggers attack H.M.S. Broadsword and H.M.S. Argonaut causing slight damage. One Dagger is destroyed by either H.M.S. Broadsword's Sea wolf or H.M.S. Plymouth's Sea cat. The pilot, Lt. Bean(C-428), is killed. In addition to her Sea wolf missiles,  H.M.S. Broadsword had another secret weapon. Her upper deck small arms battery, a mixed crew of sailors and Royal Marines, who fired at the passing Argentine aircraft with the ships 40 mm Bofors, machine-guns and rifles. The team was lead by Royal Marine Sergeant Leslie. Boardswords small arms party shot down two Argentine aircraft and damaged two others. Sergeant Leslie was awarded a DSM for his actions during the Falklands War.

1045 hours. 

Two Pucaras intercepted by No.801 Squadron CAP ( Lt. N. Ward, Lt. S. Thomas and Lt. A. Craig ). One destroyed by cannon fire from Ward's Harrier and the pilot, Major Carlos Tomba(A-511),  ejected and walked back to Goose Green. Ward later complemented Major Tomba on how he continued to fly his aircraft after Ward had filled it with so many holes.

These attacks inflicted the following damage: 
HMS Antrim seriously damaged by an unexploded bomb 
HMS Ardent sunk by attacks from A4-B (Carballo), Dagger (Mir Gonzalez, Berharndt, Robles - and Luna shot down before reaching the target) and then the A4-Q from the Argentine Navy. 
HMS Argonaut damaged and retired from theatre of operations. Only damage to the 5 attacking Skyhawks was the loss of the end of the drop tank of the leader (Filipini) when it touched one of the masts of Argonaut. That's on top of Owen Crippa's MB339 attack with guns and rockets. 
HMS Brilliant was slightly damaged by cannon fire. 
HMS Broadsword was slightly damaged by cannon fire.

Official Argentine Sources state: 
May 21st: 
9:30 hs HMS Broadsword did not shot down any plane using small guns. 
12:05 No gun damage to the 2 surviving Skyhawks 
13:35 The other 3 Daggers hit HMS Ardent with 2 bombs 
13:50 Both Donadille and Piuma Justo fired their guns to Ward

23rd May 1982. 

0930 hours. 
No.800 Squadron CAP (Flt.Lt. J. Leeming and Flt.Lt. D. Morgan) encounter four helicopters near Port Howard. One Puma, SA330L, of CAB 601 fly's into the ground while trying to evade Morgan. A second Puma is also damaged with cannon fire. An Augusta A109 is also destroyed on the ground by Morgan and Flemming using cannon fire.

1245 hours. 
Two flights of A-4B Skyhawks attack HMS Broadsword, HMS Antelope and HMS Yarmouth south of Fanning Head. Antelope hit by two unexploded bombs, one of which later explodes while being defused. HMS Antelope sank the next day. One A-4 destroyed, possibly hit by Seawolf from Broadsword or Rapier from land. Pilot, Lt. Guadagnini(C-242), is killed.

1405 Hours. 
No.800 CAP (Lt.Cmdr. A. Auld and Lt. M. Hale) encounters three Mirage Daggers over Pebble Island. One is destroyed by a Sidewinder from Hales' aircraft. The pilot, Lt Volponi(C-437), is killed.

Official Argentine Sources state: 
May 23: 
12:45 Guadagnini killed when trying to recover his plane (after missile hit) and crashed against HMS Antelope's mast.

24th May 1982. 
1005 hours. 
Four Mirage Daggers attack HMS Fearless, HMS Sir Galahad and HMS Sir Lancelot off Ajax Bay. Two Daggers damaged.

1015 hours. 
No.800 Squadron CAP (Lt.Cmdr. A. Auld and Lt. D. Smith) vectored towards four Mirage Daggers A's of FAA Grupo 6 north of Pebble Island. Two destroyed by Auld using Sidewinders and  Smith accounted for another again with Sidewinder. Maj Puga(C-410) and Capt Diaz(C-430) manage to eject but Lt Castillo(C-419) is  killed. The picture sequence on the right was taken from Aulds gun camera as he destroyed one of the Daggers.

1045 hours. 
Five A-4B Skyhawks attack HMS Sir Galahad, HMS Sir Lancelot and HMS Sir Bedivere. All ships were hit and some A-4Bs were hit.

1215 Hours. 
Three A-4C Skyhawks attack ships in Falkland Sound. All aircraft damaged and one later crashes into King George Bay, West Falkland while trying to reach the main land. The Pilot, Lt Bono(C-305) was killed. 
RFA Sir Galahad and RFA Sir Lancelot damaged by unexploded bombs. RAF Sir Bedivere damaged by a glancing bomb hit.

Official Argentine Sources state: 
May 24: 
1005: No Daggers were damaged 
1045: No Skyhawk hit

25th May 1982. 
0837 hours. 
HMS Coventry shoots down an A-4B Skyhawk of FAA Grupo 5 with Sea Dart west of West Falkland. The pilot, Lt Palaver(C-244),  was killed.

1130 hours. 


Four A4C Skyhawks attack shipping in San Carlos Water. Two were destroyed; one by H.M.S. Coventry's Sea Dart and another by H.M.S. Yarmouth's Sea Cat. Both pilots ejected, one, Lt. Ricardo Lucero(C-319) is found. Lt. Garcuia's(C-304) body is never found. The image on the right shows one of the Argentine Pilots who ejected. Lt. Ricardo Lucero of the Argentine Air Force . He was picked out of San Carlos Water and taken aboard H.M.S. Fearless where his wounds were treated by Cmdr White, a Naval Surgeon aboard Fearless. He had dislocated his left knee as he ejected.

1400-1419 Hours. 
No.800 CAP called down on A-4B Skyhawks but is called off twice by HMS Coventry. HMS Broadsword is hit and HMS Coventry sunk. HMS Fearless damaged. Possibly HMS Avenger was damaged, seeking confirmation.

Official Argentine Sources state: 
May 25: 
11:30 Capt Garcia's body found in 1983 North of Pebble. Lucero had both his legs injured. 
Carballo's C-225 slightly damaged under one wing during attack to HMS Broadsword (he damaged the ship with his 1000 lb bomb)

27th May 1982. 
1550 hours. 
Four A4B Skyhawks bomb shore units on north shore of San Carlos. One destroyed and three damaged, by HMS Fearless's 40mm guns. HMS Intrepid als claims the kill. The pilot of the destroyed aircraft, Lt. Velazco(C-215), ejects.

Official Argentine Sources state: 
May 27: 
15:50 Velazco's plane was shot down. Two of the others were damaged.

28th May 1982. 
0800 hours. 
Three Pucaras attack troops at Darwin. One shot down by Royal Marine Defence troop Blowpipe SAM.

1600 hours. 
Two MB.339s attack Darwin. One is destroyed by Blowpipe and the pilot, Lt. Miguel,  is killed.

1609 hours. 
Two Pucaras attack Darwin. One is damaged and the other destroyed by 2 Para small amrs fire . The pilot, Lt. Cruzado, ejected and captured by 2 Para.

Official Argentine Sources state: 
May 28th: 
0800 No Pucara shot down during this mission. 
1100: It's Lt Cimbaro, who damaged the second Scout with his rockets once the helicopter had landed to evade the Pucara's attacks.

1st June 1982. 
0950 hours. 

No.801 Squadron CAP (Lt. N. Ward and Lt. S. Thomas) destroy Argentine C-130 Hercules 93 km north of Pebble Island. Wards first AIM-l9 Sidewinder he fired fell short of the C-130, but the second started a fire between the port engines,  Ward then fired 240 rounds of 30mm, which broke the aircraft's wing of sending it crashing into the sea killing the 7  crew members. This particular C-130 is believed  to have been trying to repeat a bombing attempt made by another C-130 the previous day, when an Argentine C-130 made a bombing attack on a British tanker well north of the total exclusion zone. One bomb struck the ship, but bounced off to no effect.

Official Argentine Sources state: 
June 1st: 
The C-130(TC-63) was looking for sea targets using the on board weather radar. During the attack you mention to the tanker, bombs were dropped from TERs installed under the wings of the C-130! Not dropped from the back door.

7th June 1982. 
0810 hours. 
Two reconnaissance Argentine Learjets  of FAA Photo Reconnaissance Grupo 1 are engaged at 40,000ft by Sea Dart from HMS Exeter over Pebble Island. One of the Learjets, T-23 is  destroyed and Wg Cdr de la Colina and his crew are killed.

8th June 1982 
1535 hours. 
Four A4C Skyhawks attack Fitzroy area with no hits. All aircraft damaged.

1540 hours. 
Four A4B Skyhawks attack LCU F4 in Cholseul Sound. One bomb hit and the LCU sank later. No.800 Squadron CAP (Flt.Lt. D. Morgan and Lt. D. Smith) intercepts and destroys three. Morgan destroys two with Sidewinders and Smith another with a Sidewinder. All three pilots killed. Lt. Arraras(C-226), Lt. Bolzan(C-204) and Ensign Vazquez(C-228) 
Sir Galahad seriously damaged and sunk, Sir Tristam seriously damaged, Foxtrot 4 sunk, Plymouth damaged (one Dagger hit by shrapnel but not shot down)

13th June 1982. 
1121 hours. 
Seven A-4B Skyhawks attack 3 Command HQ on Mount Kent. Some hits. Three A4Bs were damaged by ground fire.

2155 hours. 
Canberra B-108 of FAA Grupo2  destroyed over San Carlos by HMS Cardiff's Sea Dart. Of the two crew men, Capt Pastran ejects, but Capt Casado is killed

Official Argentine Sources state: 
June 14th: 
Pucara's captured in flying condition: A-515, 522, 533, 549 (where armed and ready to carry out an attack mission and then return to the continent to avoid capture).

---------------------------------------------------------------

OPERATION PARAQUAT

Galtieri's seizure of the Falklands could not have been worse timed for Margaret Thatcher. Race riots in English cities, high unemployment and back bench grumbling had eroded her dominance over the Conservative Party and the House of Commons. After the Falkands fell she fired her Foreign Secretary, useful and necessary under the circumstances, but had to accept as a replacement Francis Pym(1)whose hawkishness towards the Argentineans remained in doubt until war's end. Thatcher and Pym shared a mutual dislike and mistrust. Her Foreign Office had commited that gravest of burocratic blunders, it had gestated a minor perplexity into a major crisis. She could not repose confidence in her intelligence community after its failure to assess accurately Argentina's overt preparations for war. A new political party, the Social Democrats, had risen to a 40% approval rating in nation wide polls and threatened a major victory over the Conservatives at looming local elections. Unlike Churchill, Hume or Macmillan she had never participated in a war let alone led her country in an armed conflict(2).

As soon as the very visible and expensive preparations for war were put in train allies and opponents alike clamored for quick results(3). But Galtieri and his captured kelpers were not Thatcher's sole points of concern. It was not altogether clear that Britain's professional military were of one mind about the repossession's chances of success(4). Senior military men abroad issued mordant warnings about an operation for which British forces had neither the equipment nor the expertise to complete. Setting aside her allies' skepticism and her enemies' hostility Thatcher plunged her dwindling political capital into a distant venture of whose causes and possible results few knew much(5). A war cabinet was formed(6) and the dogs of war began to bay.

Major fleet units homebound from spring exercises near Gibraltar reversed course, loaded war stores and sailed southwards. Other Royal Navy ships were put on four hours notice to move. The navy's tiny amphibious staff, moribund after cuts in its budget, cobbled together ships, men and plans for an opposed landing over unknown beaches. The Royal Marines' 3 Commando Brigade, Britain's sole amphibious force, was put on 72 hours notice to move and all its officers and men recalled from leave, schools and even a marriage. With all of that many weeks would pass before troops could assault Port Stanley. Meantime Thatcher needed a dramatic event to keep her cabinet with her, to put Galtieri on the defensive, to still her domestic opponents, to preserve US support, to rally the free world to her side and to convince the captive kelpers that they might get their freedom back. The cur dogs already nipped at her heels(7). James Callaghan, Labor's spokesman on defense, accused Thatcher of a "gross blunder" in letting the Falklands fall(8). From Thatcher's own party the Falkland Islands lobby shouted: "I told you so" so stridently that a Foreign Office spokesman was moved to retort that: "Air Commodore Frow (the lobby's spokesman) has no official standing whatever.The crisis is entirely a matter for the British government."(9) There was the Argentinean angle too. If despite his self-adulatory bluster Galtieri could be persuaded that Thatcher meant business he might heed the provisions of UN Resolution 502 and quit the islands before bloodshed began.

By 3 April 1982, Anthony Parsons, Britain's delegate to the UN, had shepherded through the UN's Security Council Resolution 502. That called for Argentina's immediate removal of its armed forces from the Falklands as a condition precedent to negotiation about Falklands' future sovereignty. Parson's brilliant diplomacy at the UN, a bare few hours after the Argentina's invasion, put the Falklands center stage in world affairs and convinced a heterogeneous assortment of 3rd world, industrialized and non English speaking states to oppose in public the junta's military adventurism. Parson's diplomatic triumph was complete. Absent Argentina's removal of its military forces Britain could now take military steps to retake the Falklands.The Soviet Union failed to veto the British resolution and non-aligned states mutely resisted the Argentinean ambassador's pleas for their help. Much to the surprise of Argentina's foreign office settlement of border disputes by armed force was not a precedent modern nation states could stomach. The reasons were clear. Even passive approval of Argentina's invasion would condone military initiatives almost anywhere else along the Amur River for example where China and the Soviet Union contested in a not always cold war(10). Thenceforth Argentina's diplomacy remained tentative and defensive.

Passage of Resolution 502 gave Thatcher room and time to maneuver, but not much. She could sequester Argentina's holdings in London, stop trade between the two countries and lobby for other nations' support. Yet no cheap or easy answers to repossession of the islands presented themselves. She could not attack Argentinean ships on the high seas because no war had been declared. She could not bomb the Argentinean mainland because so disproportionate a response would turn new found allies against her and she could not yet seize the Falklands because Britain's military was not in place(11). Parson's victory at the UN gave his Prime Minister a decaying asset that delay or a false step could quickly squander. Now that Thatcher had negotiating momentum she had to follow up Parson's triumph with military accomplishment that could not await the month long marshalling of Britain's invasion force. The British middle classes whose wrath at Argentina's theft the Prime Minister had so deftly exploited could not long exist on rhetoric; they needed blood. In twenty predominantly labor boroughs 24% of potential Tory voters considered the Falklands crisis as the most important or an important factor in the upcoming elections(12). Had it not happened Argentina's invasion of South Georgia would have to have been invented.

The seismic forces that split South America from Africa eons ago forced layers of material upwards from the earth's crust; a few broke the oceans' surface. One such is South Georgia, a mountainous mass of 1450 sq. miles shaped like a North West to South East hot dog, half permanently covered in ice. Although a merchant captain, de la Roche, may have sighted the island in 1675 Captain James Cook RN in Resolution was first to set foot on it. He named that desolate mass and claimed it for the crown on January 17,1775. At 54 deg S and 36 deg W South Georgia falls victim to some of the world's worst weather. "The wild rocks raised their lofty summits till they were lost in the clouds and the valleys laid buried in everlasting snow. Not a tree or shrub was to be seen, no not even big enough to make a toothpick. I landed in three different places and took possession of the country in his Majesty's name under a discharge of arms(13)." Until the late 20th century no one else coveted the island and the name and ownership stuck.

Pitiless weather and jagged topography, many mountains surpass five thousand feet, make the island impassable for most of its length to all but the most intrepid. Storms with 100 MPH winds are common. Violent downdrafts swoop from peaks down to ground level with little warning and savage one part of the island while leaving others in frigid calm. Ice bergs calved from sheer cliffs compete in size and menace with their larger cousins floating up from the Antarctic. Because these formations do not always show on radar screens navigation inshore, especially at night when chunks of ice slink in unnoticed, is a hazardous affair. Rubble from the wind scoured mountain sides renders them unstable underfoot. Climbers are few. Trees do not grow. Tussock grass feeds rats and a few thousand reindeer while seals, penguins and a few dozen species of bird live off the riches of the sea.

By 1960 modern methods of capturing whales en masse ended South Georgia's only economic role because there were few whales left to kill and little whale blubber left to be rendered in Grytviken's giant stills(14). A benign if unintended consequence of this sad practice occurred here. Killing whales beyond their rates of reproduction caused an overabundance of krill, a nutritional bonanza for South Georgia's seals and penguins whose numbers have soared. By 1965 the whalers, mostly Norwegian some Japanese and Russians, had left for good; their machinery rusted into scrap. Scientists from the British Antarctic Survey (BAS), the odd lost mariner and a few daring travelers clustered around Grytviken, Husvik, Leith and Stromness, the only settlements worth the name. The Survey's head was the island's de facto chief magistrate, port captain, post master and immigration agent. All in all South Georgia was not a fortuitous place to begin a war.

Argentina's capture of South Georgia, its small Royal Marines party and scientists from the BAS was at first blush a public humiliation for Thatcher. (see The Argentine Invasion of South Georgia ). In fact Argentina's occupation presented her a needed benison because recapture of that island became an immediate possibility. The defeat of ten thousand Argentinean troops in East Falkland eight hundred miles to the north would take blood, treasure and time. A hundred or so unwary Argentinean troops skulking out of the wind in wooden houses was another matter. A good chance existed that South Georgia could be repurchased on the cheap.

Thatcher ordered Admiral Fieldhouse on 7 April 1982 to reestablish British presence on South Georgia(15). The order was based on a false premise because British subjects, members of the British Antarctic Survey, remained at large in several posts around the island. A backward look at British military policy in the 1970's is needed here. It must be recalled that the costs of maintaining large ground and air forces on NATO's central front and ballistic missile submarines at sea had foreclosed solo British operations outside Europe. The men, equipment and planning for such ventures simply did not exist. Successive governments and their Treasuries had not given the Ministry of Defense enough resources to match commitments, a free Falklands for example, that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had kept in place. As a consequence the fragile command and control structure for the forces intended to seize the Falklands was an unpracticed expedient. The recapture of South Georgia burdened an embryonic organization, itself unsure of its specific goal and the means at hand to achieve it, with a task that had not been tried since WW2, the expulsion of invaders from British territory(16).

On 7 April 1982 Colonel Richard Preston, Chief of Staff of the Royal Marines' Commando Forces, telephoned LtCol. Nick Vaux CO of the Royal Marines' 42 Commando to set aside one infantry company, equipped for Arctic warfare, with supporting elements for a move on six hours notice to Ascension Island(17). From there the tiny marine force, all arctic trained, with additions from the Special Boat Service (SBS) and the Army's Special Air Service (SAS) would sail south into winter waters in order to recapture an unfamiliar island from a hostile force of unknown size and capability. Vaux nominated his second in command Major J. M. G. Sheridan RM as land commander of this force.

Though best suited for the job, Sheridan's absence from Vaux' command as it organized itself for the attack on Falklands deprived his unit and 3 Commando Brigade of a critical human asset. Vaux sensed that invasion of the Falklands, if it came to that, would be a boots in the mud affair and that victory would hang on basic soldiering in the wet and cold rather than on the high-tech gadgetry bought for combat on the North European plain. Vaux' 2nd in command fit Preston's requirements precisely. Sheridan, son and grandson of Indian Army officers, was the quintessential field grade infantry officer. He had entered the Royal Marines at age eighteen, received his commission and led troops in Aden, Borneo, Malaya, Oman and in the UK. He was a graduate of Camberly Staff College and had helped to organize and train a Commando for the Imperial Iranian Navy. A world class mountaineer and skier, he had been a member of the British Olympic Biathon team from 1969 to 1972.

Recapture of South Georgia was a zero sum game. Victory would be a thumb in Galtieri's eye. Failure in South Georgia, or even a tepid lack of success would delay or eliminate capture of the Falklands, solidify Argentina's claim to those islands and almost certainly end Thatcher's tenure as Prime Minister. Britain's inclination to interfere in military affairs outside Europe was moribund after Suez; defeat in the Falklands would bury the notion. Even in Europe Britain's position as America's best ally there would be questioned if not doubted. She could not afford a picture in the world's press of a second group of captured Royal Marines lying face down in the mud. Margaret Thatcher had never met Major J. M. G. Sheridan RM, but she had unknowingly put her political future in his hands.

On 7 April 1982 Admiral Fieldhouse ordered Captain Brian Young RN in HMS Antrim to proceed at best speed to Ascension Island. Young was concurrently placed in charge of CTG 317.9 the navy, marine and army force intended to recapture South Georgia. Sheridan was the commander land force (CLF). Besides Sheridan's marines Young had four ships: HMS Antrim and HMS Plymouth and a tanker RFA Tidespring. The fourth ship, HMS Endurance, had been the Falkland's station ship and its Captain, Nick Barker, had lengthy tactical experience in the amphibious operating area.. Young had no air support but did have a Wessex 3 ASW helo on Antrim, a Lynx utility helo on Plymouth and two Wessex 5 light helicopters on Tidespring.

Fieldhouse' directive of 9 April 1982 laid out the chain of command for Operation Corporate the name given to the retaking of the Falklands. Fieldhouse followed standard US, NATO and Allied command and control procedures for amphibious operations: the battle fleet commander, amphibious commander and land force commander are equals whatever their rank and pay grade.The Amphibious Group commander directs the amphibious force until the troops complete a secure landing and the land force commander can take up his units' fighting in a coherent and sustainable way. From that moment the land force commander orders fire support missions, logistics over the beach or by air and the host of military tasks that let him complete the operation. In fact the naval commander's only job is to get the troops and equipment onto the beach with as little damage as possible to either so that the ground mission gets done quickly with the fewest casualties(18). Sheridan's tiny force was the sole justification for Young's naval group and the point of the British spear.

The choice of Brian Young to lead CTG 317.9 was as odd as the mission he was asked to complete. He was a successful aviator and commanding officer with no over the beach amphibious experience. Both he and his hard used ship(19) were on the point of retirement when ordered to head south. He had little experience of working with Royal Marines(20). His scant knowledge of the proposed operating area came from books and briefings. Many observers then and since believe that Captain Nick Barker in HMS Endurance, the Falklands station ship, was the better choice. He had commanded a combat ship (HMS Arrow) equipped with Exocet missiles, the surface weapon that the Argentinean navy would most likely use against him. He had watched the Argentinean buildup from close at hand and knew his patch of the South Atlantic. He had landed on South Georgia and walked about. His helicopter pilots were the only British flyers competent to give the amphibious force first hand guidance on South Georgia's unique terrain and awful weather. He knew personally, not by message or letter, many of the British Antarctic Survey's staff including those few still living free on the island. A permanent detachment of Royal Marines lived aboard Endurance and had ship's duties as well. One marine was a ship's cook and another the ship's butcher. Mutual respect had flowered. Barker knew the Argentinean Navy's strengths and weaknesses better than any other Royal Navy officer. He had met and sized up many of the Argentinean officers who were now his enemies. Endurance had a full set of communications gear and regularly intercepted Argentinean military message traffic. Tactical reasoning supported the choice of Barker, too. Managing a ship in combat is difficult enough without ordering other ships and troops; it would have been more efficient if it came to a sea fight to let Barker command the squadron while Brian Young fought his own ship without the need to care for other combatants. Still Young enjoyed Fieldhouse' confidence and a close relationship with Rear Admiral Woodward CTU 317.8 his senior officer during the just finished spring exercises.

Young and Sheridan, the land force commander, faced unique problems that had little to do with their Argentinean opponents. The efficacy of a system to command, control and communicate with a patch work force operating 8000 miles from London was unproven and questionable because the British military had trained for years almost exclusively to fight a NATO war in concert with US and German allies. Staffs, logistics and battle plans, communications' links, weapons' purchases, training and intelligence efforts were aimed at convincing Soviet leaders that an attack by the Warsaw Pact would fail and that in the event their tank armies would be destroyed. The logistics of fighting an air, land and sea war 8000 miles from London had never been seriously pondered. The Royal Navy was not prepared to fight a battle whose loss could sunder the Anglo-American relationship that Britain's seaborn nuclear deterrent was meant to preserve. No standing orders existed to fight a war that involved amphibious landings a few hundred miles north of the Antarctic circle. As it turned out, neither 3 Commando Brigade nor its follow on 5 Infantry Brigade knew best how to load their gear for an amphibious assault i.e. stow the most needed equipment on top and the least necessary on the bottom. Priceless training time, was lost in reloading both amphibious and supply ships at Ascension Island and on the run south. For that matter success in Paraquat and in the whole Falklands venture hung more on the intelligence, courage and drive of rather junior infantry officers and their NCOs than on staffs' directives.

In contrast to the fleet's grand sendoff from Plymouth, Operation Paraquat was conceived and set in motion under great secrecy. Clandestinity usually wreaths military moves with importance, sometimes efficiency gains, and Paraquat was no exception. Fieldhouse established a Paraquat cell at Northwood separate from other Falklands communications and knowledge of ships' movements was restricted to a dozen or so people. On 8 April 1982 Sheridan's men, Captain Chris Nunn's M company from Vaux' 42 Commando, were sequestered in the unit's gymnasium and allowed no contact with the outside world. By 10 April 1982 two VC-10s had flown Sheridan's force of 132 men and their equipment to Ascension Island. Any thought that the repossession of South Georgia was to be a sideshow ended with Fieldhouse' message on 11 April 1982 to Thompson and Clapp that stipulated repossession of South Georgia as of equal importance to repossession of the Falklands: "as current intelligence indicates clear advantage in landing South Georgia earliest(21)." Thatcher was in a hurry. Woodward was of a different mind. He called Sheridan, the land force commander, back from Antrim yet failed to see the Royal Marines Major. Apparently Woodwardfailed to realize that Sheridan's success justified his ships' and crews' efforts. To this day the reason behind this fruitless trip remains obscure(22).

Modern warfare on the ground demands more than men firing their personal weapons. Vaux and Sheridan assembled as much of a balanced force as they could on such short notice. Awaiting departure from the gymnasium they added two .81MM mortar teams, four signalers, two sections from the commando's reconnaissance troop and three medics including a surgeon. Sheridan was also told that a section of SBS and a troop from the 22 SAS Regiment would join his force as reconnaissance elements. These additions were especially useful because they could land and reconnoiter from their small boats while fleet units remained undiscovered at sea. Sheridan's force still lacked artillery and air support without which it could be isolated and ultimately destroyed by any opponent possessing weapons heavier than .5 caliber machine guns. This deficiency was to be remedied in part by Captain Brian Young's CTU 317.9 which contained two of the Royal Navy's last gun ships, Antrim and Plymouth. Their 4 x 4.5" guns gave Sheridan a sustained firing rate, if both ships acted in concert, of 24 rounds per minute, enough to keep defending forces down in their trenches while his force made their landing. A Naval Gunfire Support Party (NGS)(23) assigned to direct the navy's gunfire gave Sheridan some confidence that he would not be out gunned at least as long as decent weather let the ships remain close ashore.

Sheridan's force as it arrived at Ascension contained 132 officers and men plus 24 Special Warfare troops. His problems had just begun and they were serious. A Royal Marines officer who had arrived at Ascension before Sheridan had set up a small arms range where troops could reset their weapons' sights after the bumpy trip from Britain. While there Sheridan learned that Northwood had ordered an entire squadron of SAS, D Squadron (60 men) commanded by Major Cedric Delves, and two more SBS teams to join his force(24). Northwood wanted seven patrols to scout the island. Common sense shouted that a reduced company of Royal Marines did not need and would have trouble finding valid employment for a reconnaisance force nearly half the size of the original force. More worrisome was the fact that Sheridan had to learn this critical fact informally on a scrap of torn paper from a fellow officer rather through his chain of command. He was not asked if he could use additional help; it was landed on him without discussion or the courtesy of a message.

Ordering seven patrols to infiltrate South Georgia, an island which none of the service chiefs in London knew, demonstrated micro management at its most meddlesome and most risky. Inserting seven patrols ashore instead of two increased the possibility of compromise geometrically. The horrible weather that might mask the patrols' insertions could also prevent them or prevent the men's exfiltration. The decision of when, where and how many to put ashore might better have been left to Young and Sheridan. Not one of Young's force had either adequate space or water or transport to the beach for these additions. Unlike buildings on land, ships at sea cannot add more room. The extra SAS men and their gear thrust an almost intolerable burden into Brian Young's once tranquil world. The ships' evaporators could not keep up with the boilers', crews' and passengers' need for fresh water and rationing began. This wretched excess fueled speculation that senior military persons at Northwood and perhaps Thatcher herself believed that the Falklands matter could be concluded in Britain's favor by a successful attack on South Georgia and that the SAS craved a major part of the action and the credit. Northwood's interference with decisions that should have been made on scene by the tactical commanders began a practice that continued throughout the war and did nothing to hasten its end.

Loadout for Operation Paraquat was a microcosm of the Falklands campaign. Sheridan's force was split immediately because no one ship in Young's squadron could carry all the personnel and their kit. Most of M Company, the core assault force, went to RFA Tidespring, a tanker, while the mortar crews, communicators, medics and naval gunfire support team went with Sheridan to HMS Antrim. Tidespring was put in the unenviable position of carrying volatile fuels and live ammunition with the immediate prospect of unloading both in rough seas. By 13 April 1982 Captain Young had been told what Sheridan knew informally: that three troops of D Squadron, about sixty men with its command element, would join his force. Through the heroic efforts of both crew and the on board marines Air Troop and Mobility Troop along with Major Delves and their great amount of kit were made safe aboard Antrim. Captain John Hamilton and his Mountain Troop went aboard Plymouth. Delves had black box communications with SAS headquarters that Sheridan did not see. It was clear that the unrequested SAS manning imposed upon Sheridan had the potential of making Operation Paraquat an SAS operation dispite the fact that he was the nominal commander of the landing force. Unity of command was to be observed in the breach.

Young's squadron rendezvoused on 14 April 1982 south of Ascension and began its run south with his assault force riding a tanker while the command elements of the three embarked military organizations lived aboard an ancient destroyer commanded by a naval officer who had never been ordered to complete an opposed amphibious landing. Neither Young nor Sheridan had a trained amphibious staff to work out problems among the very different organizations. No troop reinforcements, logistics support or air support were available. Young and Sheridan would fight hopefully the same war 8000 miles from home with what they carried. If either Tidespring or Antrim suffered major battle damage or mechanical failure the mission would abort. No unanaimous support came from the homefront either. Unbeknownst to Sheridan or Young Fieldhouse told his task group commanders at Ascension Island on 17 April 1982 that the Army's staff "remained unconvinced of the necessity and likely success of an amphibious operation. ....He told us he might be required to repossess the Falkland Islands but only when sea control was firmly established and South Georgia recaptured(25)." No one questioned the military competence and drive of Young's and Sheridan's force. It was their seniors' waffling and the improvidence of the budgeteers that put their success in question. Seldom has so much weighed on a gim-crack military force slapped together in a few days(26).

Endurance's reliable but plodding thirteen knots limited Young's force to about 350 miles advance per day. The travel time was well spent. A makeshift operations room with adequate ship to shore and ship to helicopter communications was installed aboard Antrim. Maps and charts blossomed on available bulkheads. The young marines trained incessantly in their cramped quarters and on Tidespring's more capacious decks. They consumed months of training allowances firing at targets thrown over the side(27). A major problem had to do with getting the reconaissance and assault forces ashore. Young's four ships carried no landing craft and his crews did not know how to use them anyway. Antrim carried a Wessex 3 Anti-Submarine (ASW) helicopter; Plymouth had 1 Wasp ASW helicopter and Endurance had 2 Wasps. Tidespring carried 2 Wessex 5 used mainly to transfer cargo between ships. The helicopters, none built or configured to handle more than a few passengers were already overworked from cross decking men and equipment. Cargo transfers and ASW patrols are placid affairs. Now the pilots had to train themselves for the covert insertion and recovery of the SAS and the landing, perhaps under fire, of a Royal Marines' assault force(28). Flying low under electronic silence and popping up to do a visual and brief radar search of hostile seas was as novel for the pilots as was the prospect they might be fired upon by ground troops hiding behind the next snow covered hill. Ever resourceful maintainers fitted a few GPMG in helos' doors for self protection and a modest capability for suppressive fire.

There was a very human side to this expedition, too. Naval ships are run by a hierarchy. The freshest faced seaman knows his place in the system. When the skipper or the officer of the watch orders: "Come left15 deg." the person at the wheel turns the wheel 15 deg to port and no questions are asked. On the other hand ground operations are more collegial. COs take full responsibility for their missions but usually seek their juniors' and seniors' views and occasional objections. Foolish is the young officer who does not discuss his plans with his senior sergeants. Captain Brian Young had aboard Antrim besides himself 4 commanding officers: Sheridan, Commander Land Forces (CLF); Delves, CO of D Squadron SAS; Eve, head of the Naval Gunfire Group and a junior but veteran head of the SBS detachment. In addition Antrim carried a senior helicopter pilot who headed the crews and maintainers of the embarked Wessex 3. It is a tribute to the sheer professionalism of these very competent and necessarily strong minded men that their different worlds did not fatally collide and that they all strained towards the mission's success.

Northwood's orders to Captain Brian Young to repossess South Georgia on 21 April 1982 were stipulated in his warning order of 14 April 1982 to Major Sheridan(29). With minimum damage to facilities and personnel Sheridan was to:

Recapture Grytviken and Leith.

Neutralize Argentinean Communications.

Capture or kill Argentinean military.

Arrest and remove Argentinean civilians.

Sheridan turned to his reconnaissance force and on 16 April 82 ordered D Squadron: "to establish covert patrols to determine enemy strength and disposition in Stromness, Husvik and Leith(30)." The SBS was similarly ordered to cover Grytviken and King Edward Point. It was at this point that misadventures compounded by misjudgments nearly prevented South Georgia's recapture(31).

Captain John Hamilton commanded 19 Troop (Mountain Troop) of the 22 Special Air Service Regiment (SAS). His Mission Order: "Operations Center 21 April 1982 BK 1 Ser 087" para 7 stated: "To recon Leith, Stromness, Husvik and E. Fortuna Bay for a Squadron sized attack." The Mission Orders' tasks were: "To find routes across Fortuna Glacier, Breakwind Ridge and Konig Glacier." Major Delves, the D Squadron commander insisted on an eight kilometer covert approach to the reconnaissance targets for fear of warning the Argentinean garrison. It could just as well have been argued that a blatant landing preceeded and supported by naval gunfire would frighten green, frozen and isolated troops into quick surrender.

BAS members who had been to Fortuna Glacier insisted to Delves and to Hamilton that Fortuna was virtually impassable especially with winter just breaking. Sheridan, an experienced Himalyan climber who had been head of the Royal Marines Mountain and Arctic Cadre joined the voices raised against landing on the glacier(32). Other opponents of this venture, crew and pilots from Endurance who had foot on the ground experience on South Georgia, argued that crevasses as big as London buses made it virtually certain that the SAS men could not drag their pulks (sleds) any meaningful distance even in fair weather(33). If a storm broke, as was likely now that winter had just begun, Hamilton's men would have no choice but to hunker down for an unpredictable period perhaps more than the five days allocated for the reconnaissance. The pragmatic pessimists did not sway him and he sought affirmative advice where he knew he could find it. Delves went aboard Endurance and used its satellite communications to speak with two very experienced Himalyan climbers, Stokes and Peacock, at SAS Headquarters in Britain who advised Hamilton and Delves that Fortuna Glacier could be conquered. Peacock later said he would not have gone against Sheridan's judgment if he had known that it was indeed Sheridan who opposed taking that route(34). In the end Major Delves and Captain Hamilton decided to lift mountain troop onto Fortuna Glacier.

Delves' and Hamilton's insistance that their recon mission be clandestine and thus traverse Fortuna Glacier was a counsel of perfection. Had they looked at their military problem from their opponents' point of view a different picture would have appeared(35). If the Argentine garrison considered a British attack possible or probable it had three choices besides flight by sea or surrender: first, dig in against an attack, second; get destroyed by gunfire from Plymouth and Antrim in their trenches or in BAS quarters; third flee without tactical integrity into the mountains there to die of exposure and starvation. Delves' requirement for a wholly clandestine mission fit standard SAS practices. It was a laudable but disengenuous goal. Soviet satellites overflew the area regularly and Captain Nick Barker in HMS Endurance took scheduled precautions against them(36). Admiral Fieldhouse had already warned his subordinates against transmitting when American satellites were overhead. BAS' Director signalled in the clear to his men on Lyell Glacier that: "Moving to Grytviken possibly involves risk of involvement in later fighting."(37) It is a good rule in such matters that when two parties besides the annointed know hitherto secret information many others almost certainly have an inkling of the matter at hand. By 21 April 1982 it is very likely that several thousand people of different nationalities, except perhaps Argentinean, knew what was about to happen to the well chilled garrisons in Grytviken and Leith(38).

Young and Sheridan knew, on the other hand, almost exactly what they might face once British troops had landed. No ships had reenforced the Argentinean garrison who had no air cover and no artillery. The island could not support more than a few hundred persons, in winter probably fewer. The quality and fighting spirit of the Argentineans was unknown but reasonable men could assume that their1st line troops, always in short supply, were posted either on the Chilean border or on the Falklands themselves and that those few on South Georgia were not assiduously patrolling the mountains now that winter had begun, but rather had esconced themselves in BAS' snug wooden houses(39). South Georgia had no airfield. Troops could not be flown in and no hostile naval activity had been noted. No naval fueling facilities, magazines or repair shops existed for modern warships. The Argentinean occupiers would defend their conquest if they chose to do so, with what little they had at hand. Winter would argue against their retreat into the sub-freezing hinterlands. In short South Georgia was a primitive and isolated military outpost with wretched living conditions eight hundred miles from Falklands that posed no threat to the outside world. It was scarcely defensible. Thatcher and her advisors had got that right.

As Hamilton and Delves planned their clandestine insertion from the ships at sea teams from the BAS who were on the ground performed their own reconnaissance. BAS' Peter Stark who had lived on South Georgia for two years was flown back from the island to HMS Endurance for the express purpose of dissuading Hamilton's troop from trying the Fortuna route. The BAS parties, thirteen plus two wildlife photographers, at Bird Island and Schliepper Bay at the northern tip of the island, at Lyell Glacier and at St. Andrew's Bay, south of Grytviken, traversed their areas on foot and met no Argentinean military. On 20 April 1982 Tony North and Myles Plant watched Cumberland Bay from Barff Point and discovered nothing. Ian Barker and Damien Sanders stood on the high ground between East and West Cumberland Bay and saw neither Argentinean ground nor naval activity. They found no trace of any Argentinean patrols ever having surveilled those likely pieces of military ground. No planes were heard either. The watchers, although not military, had surveyed all but a small area of likely Argentine ground and naval activity and more if the foul weather were considered. It was clear to them that the Argentinean invaders had confined themselves to the comforts such as they were of village life. The BAS patrols, all of whom had useful but short range radios, reported their findings back to Northwood with great speed in a complex radio arrangement that went through South Orkney to Ascension Island thence to BAS headquarters in Cambridge. There Dr. Bernard Law transferred the data to Rear Admiral Tony Wheatley RN at Northwood. At Cambridge BAS headquarters entertained, prior to the the Fortuna Glacier incident, a constant flow of visitors from the Royal Navy, SAS, SBS and various other parties all eager to learn what the intrepid researchers on South Georgia daily took as normal existance. Counsel was freely given(40).

Given the plethora of current data available to SAS headquarters and to Capt. Hamilton his mission order astounds: "To date only information is available from studying maps, air photos and limited local knowledge from BAS personnel and the members of the crew from HMS Endurance."(41) This statement, though patently erroneous, formed the basis for the SAS' plan to take the hazardous route across Fortuna Glacier. In the interests of a clandestinity that was clearly unnecessary Delves and Hamilton rejected first hand information of crucial tactical importance gained by trained scientific observers and by the crew and pilots of HMS Endurance. The cruel fact is that on board Antrim and Endurance, on South Georgia itself and lurking in the British intelligence system were good information and mature judgment on it that most reasonable leaders would have taken as cause to change routes for observing Husvik, Leith and Stromness. Delves and Hamilton were men of their time and exemplars of a splendid bellicist culture. In the matter of Fortuna Glacier they went beyond reason and common sense.

Three helicopters took D Squadsron's Mountain Troop to Fortuna Glacier: Lcdr. Ian Stanley's Wessex 3 from Antrim and from Tidespring's C Flight two Wessex 5s flown by Lt. Mike Tidd RN and Flight Lt. Andy Pulford RAF. Stanley's helicopter was equipped for ASW and had excellent radar, sonar and navigational gear. It carried doppler radar that permitted the pilot to fly safely even if he lost eyeball contact with his reference points on the ground. The two Wessex 5s whose pilots had some experience with covert insertions of troops were utility helicopters and lacked Stanley's sensitive navigational equipment. Stanley was to navigate for all three helicopters in the poor weather and white outs that are the bane of flying through snow.

At 0930 on 21 April Ian Stanley lifted off from Antrim to find a landing site. Taking Cape Constance on his port side he flew SE over Possession and Antarctic Bays and saw no military activity. After vetting Fortuna Glacier he returned to Antrim and loaded up his passengers from Mountain Troop. Accompanied by the two Wessex from Tidespring that carried the rest of the troop they made for Fortuna only to be turned back by a snow squall near Possession Bay(42). Bear in mind that it is not only distance that is critical in such insertions but the weather between helicopter and landing site. Five hundred yards behind a snow squall that prevents accurate navigation is as good as a hundred miles in preventing a safe landing. Stanley took Delves and Hamilton on a second recon, this time in deceptively decent weather and Delves ordered a second try. Day light was slipping by and it was best to land the troop and to get off the glacier onto firm ground by darkness. The second try at landing succeeded. By early afternoon sixteen men from Mountain Troop and three pulks (sleds) were safe on Fortuna Glacier. Just after the landing the weather worsened and the troop progressed barely a half mile before darkness forced a halt to the their tortuous slogging.

The night of 21/22 April 1982 saw the worst of South Georgia's weather. Off shore Antrim lashed down its gear as winds rose to one hundred miles per hour. A Force11 sea broke waves over the tired old ship and the barometer registered 965 millibars, lower than most seamen experience in a lifetime. Even worse the helicopters secured to Antrim's and Tidespring's decks shuddered almost to their break points. On the glacier Hamilton's men and their kit were safe but buried cold in the snow. Winds wrent tent poles and fabric alike. The horrendous weather continued and the men's physical condition began to deteriorate. Military operations even passive reconnaissance became impossible. At 1100 on 22 April 1982 Hamilton radioed Antrim: "Unable to move. Environmental casualties immanent."(43)

Snow squalls delayed Stanley's rescue attempt for forty-five minutes. Even then storms made him order the two Wessex 5s to wait on Cape Constance eight kilometers from the glacier while he found the SAS men and a landing site from which it was safe to rescue them. The weather foiled even Stanley's sophisticated navigational gear and his helicopter's air frame began to take on ice. Stanley scrubbed the mission and all three helicopters returned aboard Tidespring and Antrim.

Refueled, the three helos took off at 1330 for a second rescue attempt. This time breaks in the weather and orange smoke grenades brought rescuers and exhausted soldiers together. Tidd, the first pilot to land, quickly loaded his Wessex 5 with six SAS men and their kit and took off. A few minutes later he ran into the dreaded whiteout and without Stanley's helo to guide him crashed into the glacier. His unwanted landing site was cushioned in snow and while the helo was destroyed its occupants emerged by a fluke of fate shaken but alive. Ian Stanley in his Wessex 3 guided the second Wessex 5 to the crash site. The crash's survivors minus their heavy equipment crawled into the two helos and took off for the ships' warm bunks. The Wessex 5 flew close astern Stanley's mother hen but lost sight of it over the glacier's rim. By ill chance it flew into another whiteout and crashed. Stanley's helicopter already fully loaded had no choice but to head back to Antrim. As the thin Arctic sunlight disappeared two helicopters were lost, two of the SAS men had been rescued and two helo crewmen joined the fourteen SAS men stranded on the glacier. Sixteen valuable men found themselves unharmed but unable to perform any military mission and facing another night on the glacier in ever worsening weather. Any hope of completing the reconnaissance had ended. Young the amphibious force commander (until the land forces were firmly established ashore) knew no more about his target at the end of the day than he had at its beginnning. He did know that some troops under his command were in mortal straits, that he, a senior and experienced aviator, had lost two helicopters and that the goal of seizing South Georgia was in jeopardy. Sheridan the land force commander could do nothing unless and until the SAS problem got ressolved. Upon being told of the men marooned atop Fortuna Thatcher commented: "My heart was heavy.....How was I to conceal my feelings? I wondered if the task we had set for ourselves was truly impossible."(44) On Endurance Captain Nick Barker was more direct: "In military terms the whole operation had become a monumental cockup."(45)

Young and his operations crew aboard Antrim faced calamity. A two man emergency rescue team from the Royal Marines' Mountain and Arctic cadre was alerted on Tidespring where another problem surfaced. "I... had checked through their kit with them. In my view it wasn't very good. It was standard army issue - not as good as our stuff. There are recognized techniques for getting yourself out of a crevasse......it was my opinion those guys just didn't have that sort of gear, that they would not be able to haul themselves up the insides of a crevasse."(46)

By now a reconnaissance operation had degenerated into an odds against rescue operation. Stanley had few assets: a battered helicopter, the only Wessex left, and two hours of daylight to fly through awful weather in order to rescue sixteen men in terminal condition. Taking a new route to the glacier he found the survivors huddled inside inflated rafts used as tents and landed, the last hope for rescue that day. As the weather worsened he piled in all sixteen men --- the SAS men reluctantly left their kit and weapons except for sidearms --- and took off fifteen hundred pounds above the helicopter's maximum design weight. Stanley made his way back to Antrim, his sixth trip from Fortuna Glacier, and landed on Antrim's pitching deck in a controlled crash.

Military operations succeed or founder on judgments made about the enemy his size, equipment, numbers and location. Not so the Fortuna Glacier affair because no opposing forces were involved. Delves and Hamilton misjudged the data they possessed about Fortuna and overestimated their own capability. A clandestine insertion had become an air-ground mob scene, its central purpose compromised, its participants in jeopardy. This most unusual episode occurred despite the fact that Special Warfare operatives rank among the best intelligence gatherers and the most realistic analysts of tactical situations(47). No military objective had been reached during the preceeding twenty-four hours but Stanley had delivered Young and his force from disaster, saved sixteen lives and spared Margaret Thatcher another acute embarrassment. Stanley received a DSO for his extraordinary feat of technical flying and for his bravery. His passengers concluded that was little enough.

2 SBS came south on Endurance and it was their turn to reconnoiter Sheridan's possible landing sites from south of Leith and Grytviken ie from across Cumberland East Bay. Hound Bay, at the seaward neck of Barff Peninsula, was the insertion point for three SBS patrols. They were to make their way on foot half way up the peninsula, pick up two Gemini rafts dropped from helicopters and cross the bay to Brown Mountain. That low mountain was one of the two pieces of vital ground whose seizure was necessary for any attack on Grytviken. The mountain also provided a point from which Argentinean activity, if any, could be closely scrutinized. That two BAS men, Myles Plant and Tony North lived in the proposed patrol area and had seen no Argentine military activity did not deter the SBS leader from mounting his operation. He was of course safe from superiors' direct advice and criticism because Sheridan and Young were on Antrim many miles away. Ellerbeck flew his helicopter from Endurance to Cindy Buxton and Anne Price's hut on St Andrew's Bay to warn them of incipient military activity. They too had seen nothing of the Argentinean invaders.

Ellerbeck delivered only one patrol, four men and their kit, before bad weather prevented more flying. The ashore SBS patrol met the two BAS men, Plant and North, who reaffirmed that no Argentinean military lurked in the vicinity. The SBS patrols still on Endurance were not to be thwarted and went ashore by Gemini courtesy of Captain Nick Barker who brought his ship as close to shore as prudence allowed - under 1000 meters. The Geminis' motors then failed the three patrols as they tried to cross Moraine Fjord to get to their lookout point atop Brown Mountain(48). The night of 22/23 April 1982 the marines slept a frigid sleep behind rocks on Dartmouth Point. In the morning the patrol leaders reluctantly concluded that their unreliable outboard motors and ice-punctured Gemini hulls had ended their military mission. They decided on exfiltration.

A confluence of untoward events occurred here. The SBS patrols on Dartmouth Point could not reach by radio either Antrim or Endurance. They could not return to Endurance nor could they complete a military mission. Unproven reports of an Argentinean submarine's presence had prompted Young to withdraw Antrim beyond the SBS' radio's range; Endurance lacked the code books to decrypt SBS messages anyway. True they could go to ground for days if necessary but the fact was that the SBS men were stranded(49).

"South Georgia op seems bogged down for fear of Arg submarine (conventional, Sante Fe)."(50) Santa Fe's torpedoes were a potential risk for Young's force but they did not present a clear and present danger. Santa Fe's submerged speed approximated Tidespring's thirteen knots; its sustained surface speed just that. The tactical offense posed by two twenty-five knot destroyers and their embarked helicopters with active sonars in use against an ageing diesel submarine with generic electrical problems is lethal(51). Because of its low top speed and the noise it would emit at that speed it was extremely unlikely that Santa Fe could gain a position that allowed a high probability of a successful attack on any of the British ships. True Endurance's radio crew had intercepted messages from an overflying Argentinean aircraft giving that ship's position to an Argentinean submarine. That coordination made sense because Endurance's loud diesel engines could be easily picked up by the submarine's sonar and because Endurance had no sonar of its own to warn of impending attack. Worse Barker's ship could not turn handily to avoid an observed torpedo. Yet a quick read of the tactical situation showed that a submarine attack seemed very improbable; Santa Fe's job was to land troop reenforcements on South Georgia and not to brawl with British surface ships and ASW helicopters. A diesel submarine manned by an unblooded crew and burdened by a motley crowd of landsmen is most unlikely to prosecute an attack, risky in itself, that would draw the mortal attention of a British nuclear submarine captain trained to hunt down Soviet nuclear boats.

In fact one overriding reason should have prevented the undeserved deference that the Royal Navy paid to Santa Fe. Amphibious ships, purpose built or not, are meant to sail in harm's way in order to get the troops to the assault area. Men of war that carry amphibious forces cease being independent military assets and become ancillary to the troops' mission. Such ships become subordinate to the specific military task of occupying defended ground. Whatever Young's assessment of the risk to his own ship and crew putting Sheridan's marines ashore was his sole reason for being in South Georgia's waters. Then too excessive caution breeds its own potential for disaster. If any British ship had sunk fifty miles NE of South Georgia the crew and passengers would all have drowned. If disaster had occurred close aboard Grytviken or Leith some at least might have lived. Many seafarers still believe that a ship sunk going towards the fight causes no dishonor but that damage suffered away from the conflict raises questions about sound planning and tactics.

Finally on 23/24 April night Antrim picked up the SBS signal and after some discussion Endurance was ordered to rescue the isolated marines from Barff Peninsula. Barker's two small utility helicopters, piloted by Ellerbeck and Finding, removed the men minus their wretched Geminis and mal functioning motorsto Endurance' warmth; a second reconnaissance effort had misfired(52). The communications debacle that had marooned the SBS team ashore on Barff Peninsula was only a part of the muddle that permeated Young's operations. In separating Tidespring to refuel from Brambleleaf and in dividing his force up into two sub units: Plymouth and Endurance; and Antrim and Tidespring, Young lost defensive advantage against the putative diesel submarine, communications among the forces he was supposed to put ashore and Barker's and his pilots' valuable advice. Discreet military accomplishment would have justified this maritime hurly-burly, but by 24 April 1982 nothing of value had been gained, no ground recon completed and certainly no military objective gained. In fact only the prodigious flying feats of his helicopter pilots had saved Young's force from disaster. Sheridan remained a ship's guest rather than the commander of a landed infantry force.

D Squadron had one more reconnaissance card to play. Captain Timothy Burls' Boat Troop set out from Antrim at 0300 on 22 April 1998. They were to reconnoiter Leith, Husvik and Stromness from positions on Grass Island. A small but potentially bothersome garrison was thought to be guarding Leith Harbor and its disused whaling station. Because reconnaissance of Leith from Fortuna had failed an observation of Leith from Grass Island, a few thousand meters west in Stromness Bay seemed a good alternative especially as the presence of kelp precluded other feasable landing sites. Fifteen men deployed in five boats. Remember helicopters had come into short supply. Immediately after launching, three motors failed and the two working Gemini that remained took the three stalled boats in tow. When Endurance and Fort Austin had met at sea on 12 April Boat Troop had exercised its Gemini inflatables and their motors had also failed at that time. The continued failure of these motors in critical evolutions stymied the efforts of hundreds of millions of dollars of complex military equipment manned by thousands of trained operators. It remains a mystery why the SAS chose to go to war with a system of proven unreliability.

About 0400 wind and water combined in a ferocious storm that nearly swamped all the boats. Tow lines were broken, each crew struggled on its own. Three boats, including Captain Burls', made Grass Island and were buried. The nine men then established an OP from which they could see Leith and Stromness and Burls radioed his reports back to Antrim. At this point he had lost two of his five boats with no knowledge of whether they had drowned, put up on a distant shore, blown out to sea or been captured by the Argentineans. The control team on Antrim feared the worst. Because of a waterlogged motor and fierce winds one lost boat, Delta, was blown far off the route to Grass Island and just managed to paddle to safety near Larsen Pt. Inexplicably this Gemini lacked a radio beacon and could not transmit the crew's location. The other stray, Bravo boat, its motor inoperative and its crew exhausted, blew steadily eastward away from South Georgia out to sea. It, too, lacked a rescue beacon with enough range to contact Antrim but by luck contacted Burls on the troop's tactical network. He in turn radioed Antrim whose pilots and meteorological officers worked out Bravo's possible position. The ever resourceful Ian Stanley took off at 0800 in his Wessex 3 and at altitudes under two hundred feet conducted a classic box search. Just as his fuel supply left him no choice but to return to Antrim, Stanley's crewman Fitzgerald spotted the drifting raft, winched up its crew and returned them to the comforts of Antrim's wardroom. There Bravo boat's crew owned up to the fact that the troop had enjoyed no pre mission inspection of equipment and did not have an agreed upon rendezvous point (RV).

Yet much had been accomplished. Now one recon team of nine SAS men could observe, without discovery, Argentine activity in and around Stromness Bay. But this view from afar did not afford an accurate count of the Argentinean soldiery. At night on 23 April the Burls' nine men attempted to cross from Grass Island to the mainland, a few hundred meters. Again two of the three motors failed and the Geminis returned to Grass Island. A second try failed for the same reason and in the end the team crossed by paddling. That early morning Boat Troop or three teams of it completed the task towards which so much effort had been directed. Doing what it does best Burls' diminished troop reported back to Delves aboard Antrim the existance of a garrison of sixteen Argentinean marines and no supporting artillery. One sentry stood languid watch during the dark hours(53).

By the afternoon of 23 April 1982 Endurance's listeners and Spanish language translators had intercepted transmissions from an Argentinean C-130 to and from a submarine whose signal strength indicated it was a hundred miles from Endurance(54) and perhaps closer to Antrim. This information prompted Northwood and Young to send the two tankers, escorted by Plymouth, 200 miles NE out of harm's way. Antrim followed shortly. This decision left Endurance unprotected and the main assault force aboard Tidespring heading away from South Georgia(55). True HMS Conqueror was headed south to intercept the Santa Fe but the meeting would take many hours. Simultaneously Northwood detached and sent to South Georgia HMS Brilliant with its 1st class sonar and two ASW helicopters. Further intercepts by Captain Barker's crew disclosed that the Argentine submarine was to attack Endurance and deliver reenforcements to the Garrison at Leith.

Here both sides erred. At 0300 on 24 April 1982 Young ordered his force to clear South Georgia's waters and to rendezvous two hundred miles NE(56). This odd direction scattered Young's force and lost its ability to bring the fight to the Argentinean submarine. Antrim, Brilliant, Plymouth and Conqueror acting in concert could have destroyed or sent away the Santa Fe in very short order. The Argentine navy's move was equally strange. Knowing that sooner or later the Royal Navy would have at least one nuclear sub in the area the Argentinean navy imprudently sent only one antiquated submarine without air cover to target a non-combatant when it should have sought to destroy a ship, either Antrim or Plymouth, that could destroy it. Santa Fe's small size, its slow underwater speed and the onset of nasty winter weather mandated only one mission at a time, transport troops or find and kill Endurance, not both. There is little doubt that HMS Conqueror working alone could have made short work of a WW2 diesel submarine(57).

On the British side Young had lost the capacity, at least for the moment, to deliver Sheridan's force to the beach --- his sole reason for being around South Georgia. At 1600 on 24 April 1982 Captain Barker communicated to Vice-Admiral David Halifax at Northwood his concern about being the Santa Fe's target and was told: "There's really very little to worry about."(58) Northwood, now aware of the Santa Fe's approximate position and certain that the tankers carrying the force's fuel and assault force lay out of harm's way, ordered Plymouth to return from its protective duties. Barker's concern for his ship's safety was justified but by this time the six helicopters on Brilliant, Antrim, Plymouth and Endurance, however underequipped to prosecute an attack on a clever sub skipper, were positioned to search for Santa Fe as it brought its troop reenforcements to Cumberland Bay. Their home ships were still too distant from Grytviken to form the ASW screen that would bar Santa Fe from landing its troops.

At dawn on the 25th the helicopters began their search. Once again Ian Stanley from Antrim found the target, dropped two old fashioned depth charges and damaged the Santa Fe enough to make her an easy surface target for machine gun, missile and ASW torpedo attacks by any British ship or helicopter in the neighborhood. Santa Fe did not dive; Stanley's depth charge attacks were so accurate that the sub's ballast tanks were terminally damaged and she became easy prey for ensuing attacks by Young's helicopters. Captain Bicain limped back into Grytviken harbor, tied up his boat alongside the BAS jetty at King Edward Point and watched as its flooded stern sank below the surface. This drama fit the bizarre side of the Falklands war. Submarines are accurately typed; in war zones they navigate under water where layers of differing salinity and temperature protect them from direct observation and hostile sonar. That Bicain did not take advantage of the hundred or so fathoms of cold water under his keel in order to elude British attackers meant that he could not dive because his boat had ovewhelming mechanical failure(59). Nor did his limited speed allow him to break off the action. Bicain could not fight, hide or run; he was a sitting duck. He could honorably have struck.

The helicopters' attacks proved equally odd. Bicain's boat was initially and as it turned out terminally damaged by depth charges so named because they function best at depths of water where an explosion close to a hull causes water pressure to burst the hull. The trick is to get this very low tech weapon to explode near the sub's hull. Used against a surfaced craft much of a depth charge's force vanishes ineffectually into the air. Ian Stanley's splendid airmanship and good fortune continued. Battered into unseaworthiness Santa Fe turned back to port and on the way got hit by helicopters' AS -12 missiles whose fuzes did not detonate their missiles' warheads because the sub's plastic sail did not offer sufficient resistance. ASW torpedoes fired at Santa Fe's screws were ineffective because these do not detonate unless the target is more than thirty feet underwater and Santa Fe was surfaced. The British attacks had laudable intent --- the idea behind war is to destroy the enemy --- but the better part lay in getting Bicain to surrender his boat and crew intact once he began his limp back to shore. Code books, live prisoners and captured weaponry are far more valuable than bodies and metal on the sea bottom.

Prior to this dramatic diversion Northwood had repeatedly taxed Sheridan, the land force commander, for his lack of progress in recapturing South Georgia. The reasons for Sheridan's restraint were clear. Delves and Hamilton, not Sheridan, made the decisions, calamatous as they turned out, about SAS' insertions, a condition precedent to the main landing. While wishing a speedy end to South Georgia's recapture Northwood had ordered the bulk of Sheridan's landing force away from the landing sites to protect it from the Santa Fe, reconnaissance had not been completed and two of his helicopters had been lost on on imprudent mission that he had opposed. In this instance the Royal Navy had showed greater concern for a wimpy submarine threat that did not exist anyway than for its task of getting a coherent body of troops ashore. Indeed up to 25 April Sheridan had not had Antrim and Plymouth together for gun fire support on Argentinean positions. By 1100 on 25 April 1982 everything had changed. Plymouth with its twin 4.5" guns stood offshore nearby Antrim. Sheridan sensed that the defeat of the Santa Fe, now a leaking hulk at Grytviken, would have demoralized the original garrison and that the reenforcements just debarked from Santa Fe would be in no condition to fight.

Sheridan knew that disabling the Santa Fe was only an intermediate step and not the victory he had been sent to obtain. The jackpot was ownership of Grytviken. He waited upon Young, the amphibious force commander, outside his cabin door to ask that the ships be positioned so that helicopters could lift a scratch force of seventy five men to attack and seize Grytviken. Tidespring carrying his main assault force was more than fifty miles away and the remnants of Boat Troop remained esconced on Grass Island. Sheridan judged that his command element, the mortar teams, Delves' few SAS men, the marines from Endurance and SAS men from Plymouth could break the Argentinean defenses if landed quickly with naval gunfire support. It was a bold judgment made without computers or any other form of high technology; rather it was the gut feeling of a long time infantryman, comfortable in his own skin, who knew what heartens or demoralizes green troops holding positions against whom or what they could not know. Delay in landing British troops could mean hardened Argentinean defenses. Sheridan had to wait for three hours for Young's approval - he remained overall commander until the troops landed - while Young and his aviators replayed the attacks on Santa Fe, ascertained who engaged first, (it was Stanley) and who might get the decorations if any. The helos had returned victorious from their attacks by1030 but it was not until 1330 that Young agreed to put ashore the landing force. Without the formality of an O Group, Sheridan gave hasty orders to his officers at 1345.?

Sheridan's plan was simple and quick of execution. His landing force, seventy-five men, was less than half its intended size. Because he had only five helicopters --- two were destroyed on Fortuna Glacier but two small Lynx had arrived on HMS Brilliant --- he could land only twenty men at a time. Landings are best made at dawn to use a full day's light; circumstances gave Sheridan at most five hours from takeoff to win the battle. He had, however, regained one precious asset, the four naval guns on Antrim and Plymouth.The marine's plan encompassed two pieces of vital high ground: Brown Mountain is eleven hundred feet high, it lies south from Grytviken and a few hundred yards across King Edward Cove; and Bore Valley Pass that lay west and behind Grytviken. Seizure of these two dominating points virtually guaranteed Grytviken's submission. Sheridan ordered Delves' SAS group to secure the landing site, Hestesletten a morain at the base of Brown Mountain. As soon as the second wave had landed and established its position Delves was ordered to "advance to contact" that is engage hostile forces and seize the top of Brown Mountain. Sheridan and his command element would land after the second group had secured the landing site from which Delves should already have pushed off. At this point helicopters would lift the remaining troops from Plymouth and Endurance to Bore Valley Pass in order to give supporting fire to the main body as it advanced from Brown Mountain into Grytviken.

Sheridan's fire plan, worked out with LtCol Eve RA, was critical to his mission's success. The four guns on Antrim and Plymouth were his only artillery. Ten minutes before the first element landed, at1335, British 4.5'' shells rained in great profusion on Hestesletten, the landing site, a flat patch of rocky earth at the foot of Brown Mountain. Hestesletten though small was the only flat surface close to Brown Mountain that was suitable for helo landings and troops' assembly. It had to be made safe. Fifteen minutes later the fire switched to the top of Brown Mountain as the SAS men emerged from the helos to secure the landing site. No enemy fire greeted Delves' men then or later that day. The naval gunfire killed no one and destroyed no positions but it was a precisely timed demonstration of accurate shooting well seen and heard by the Argentinean garrison(60). Sheridan ordered in his second group, Royal Marines, and then arrived himself at1535 with his command element and medics. Already short of daylight Sheridan was livid with rage at Delves who had not obeyed orders to advance to contact enemy forces in the direction of Brown Mountain and to seize its summit. Delves replied that an Argentine position lay at the mountain's top. Sheridan ordered Delves again to advance and Delves moved forward over stony ground onto and up Brown Mountain. As a preliminary to their attack, the SAS men fired Milan missiles at a suspected enemy position only to discover that they had killed two seals who were disporting themselves on the banks of the Penguin River. No Argentinean troops awaited Delves and his men on Brown Mountain.

Sheridan's advance met no opposition nor was a hostile shot fired at the advancing British troops. While the British scurried to the top of Brown Mountain naval gunfire shifted to its third phase. Sheridan had been ordered to avoid whereever possible damage to BAS buildings and to persons. Accordingly his fire plan's third phase directed ships' gunfire to land over and behind the BAS buildings and the Argentinean defensive positions. The defending Argentinian troops then realized that only a slight adjustment meant heavy fire onto them. Before South Georgia the Argentine marines had never been under fire let alone that of accurately registered naval guns. At 1705, ninety minutes after his arrival, Sheridan saw two white flags fluttering from the main buildings in Grytviken. He called off the landing in Bore Valley Pass and began the three kilometer march in Grytviken. Delves' SAS men leaped forward and he declined to answer Sheridan's call to halt. Sheridan called Antrim for a helicopter that took him into Grytviken to accept the surrender from the Argentinean commanding officer, LtCdr Luis Lagos. Sheridan took the surrender himself ashore as light failed.

On 26 April 1982 a bare three weeks after Port Stanley fell, the commander of Argentine forces on South Georgia Lt Cdr Lagos had signed the formal instrument of surrender in the BAS base at King Edward Point. Dispite the delays, the navy's unfamiliarity with amphibious operations, the failed reconnaissance, the threat real or imagined of submarine attack, the ramshackle command structure, the dispersion of his assault force, the SAS' faulty motors on their gemini boats and the near disaster of Fortuna Glacier Sheridan put the best face on the nasty business of war. He had completed his military mission with no casualties to his own men or to the enemy either(61).

Just after Lagos' surrender of all Argentine forces (130+ Men) on South Georgia, Lcdr. Astiz who commanded the fifteen Argentinean marines at Leith was told to lay down arms prior to the arrival of a British force on the morning of the 26th or to accept the consequences. The surrender of the main Argentinean garrision, the sound and fury of the naval guns and the certain presence of British troops quickly extinguished his prolix bravado and he yielded. The picture shown in the world's press of Astiz signing an instrument of surrender aboard Plymouth in Leith gave a false impression that Astiz was surrendering Argentinean forces on South Georgia. In fact the garrison's surrender under law took place on the previous day ashore in BAS quarters. Astiz signed only for the fifteen Argentinean marines in Leith; his act duplicated unecessarily Lagos' capitulation to Sheridan of all Argentinean forces on South Georgia the day before(62). Even in defeat Astiz sought and was granted the limelight.

Sheridan the land force commander was stunned to receive from Northwood a message asking his list of those to be decorated for the victory. Thatcher held a jubilant al fresco press conference outside No 10 Downing Street: "Just rejoice at that news and congratulate our forces and the marines ... Rejoice"(63). South Georgia was not a victory for which combat decorations might have issued because there was no ground combat. Sheridan's landing force had received no incoming fire and suffered no casualties(64). In fact the operation was a string of blunders rescued from utter disaster mainly by the moral and physical courage of Major J. M. G. Sheridan RM and Lcdr. Ian Stanley RN. True many others had been cold, wet, tired and in danger of losing their lives to the weather but none had shown valor in the face of enemy fire because there had been no military opposition. That would come later.

Operation Paraquat was a slip shod affair conducted by a high command that did not pair adequate human or material resources to the task. It diverted resources from the main goal, seizure of Port Stanley. The excuse could be made that a first try at amphibious warfare was bound to be difficult but that does not vindicate dispersing the assault force before a World War 2 diesel submarine away from its target beach nor does it justify the poor decision making that went into the Fortuna Glacier incident or the Grass Island reconnaissance. The SAS failed in South Georgia because they used equipment known to be faulty, because they did not credit mountain men with more experience than they and because fate and nature do not care how clever or strong humans claim themselves to be.

Sheridan's capture of Grytviken and Leith showed the many sides to this small war. A small and bloodless military affair metamorphosed into a major political victory. If ever the Royal Marines had proven their worth to the politicians this was the occasion. Thatcher was not yet the Warrior Queen, that would take blood, time and Port Stanley's seizure, but she had restored British sovereignty to a tiny bit of hijacked property. She could, moreover, hold a cabinet together long enough to gain a much needed victory because a few Royal Marines took the initiative and won a dicey military engagement 8000 miles from home. For the first time since Suez a British Prime Minister undertook diplomatic/military responsabilities outside NATO, risked blood, treasure and her job and prevailed dispite a clumsy military command and control system about which she knew very little. British professional military, especially pilots and infantry, finished the job, heroically so in some instances, despite their seniors' lapses. The Argentine military, on the other hand, had no rationized plan for the defense of their new holdings. The Argentine Navy demonstrated strategic and tactical incompetence in the loss of Santa Fe. It would not come out again to fight in the face of submarine and surface opposition.

Systemic flaws surfaced, too. The reconnaisance practices of the Special Warfare units needed refinement and equipment up to their tasks. The SAS was willing to overman an operation, compromise the operation's command and control system, overburden ships and logistics and risk incomprehensably in order to gain a place in the sun. Too many of those involved refused to accept perfectly good intelligence because it did not oringinate from within. The Royal Navy did not have a grip on the essence and purpose of amphibious operations, getting troops ashore. Yet these shortcomings did not overwhelm. Down deep in the Corps of the Royal Marines, far from desks and parade grounds, rather junior officers and enlisted men possessed a competence and an obduracy that would overcome enormous obstacles even those posed by their own side.

Notes:

1.  On 18 April 1982 Francis Pym told the House of Commons that force would not be used as long as negotiations continued. That policy would have prevented Operation Paraquat. Either Pym had not been told of the plans to retake South Georgia by force or he had decided to formulate his own policy on the war. The former is more likely. Pym was forced to return to the House later that night and to withdraw his remarks. Downing Street Years p 204. 
2. "On June 28 there was talk of changing all senior commanders." Allan Clarke p 70. Certain proof of the naivete of those who had never warred. 
3. "The press was very hostile." Thatcher p 185. 
4. "John gave the MoD's view that the Falklands could not be retaken once they were seized." The Downing Street Years, page 179. Galtieri's junta agreed. 
5. Thatcher herself erred when in her opening statement to the House of Commons on April --, 1982 she mentioned the "Falkland Islands and their dependencies." South Georgia ia a dependency of Great Britain itself and administered from the Falkland Islands. The Downing Street Years, page 183. 
6. The War Cabinet consisted of: Margaret Thatcher, Francis Pym forced on her by the House; John Nott the scapegoat for all that gone wrong; Willie Whitlaw the ubiquitous gray man of conservative politics without whom nothing significant could occur and Cecil Parkinson, narrowly defeated by Thatcher for Prime Minister and ready to assume that job when Thatcher stumbled. Sir Terence Lewin, Chief of the Defense Staff, needed to pull Thatcher's fat from the fire and the Attorney General Michael Havers ready to offer legal fig leaves for military action also attended. From time to time sundry FCO and military people like Brigadier Peter de la Billiere, head of the Special Warfare community a firm believer in the coup de main to solve the knottiest of problems abroad. Quite properly no delegate from the Treasury was present because Thatcher wanted no niggling about the war's costs. At least one meeting was held each day. Thatcher. Downing Street Years p 188-9. 
7. "The mob was always ready to wack MT if things went wrong especially Timothy Kitson, Chairman of the Select Committee on Defense, a prey to blandishment from every quarter."."Allan Clarke ---- p 64. 
8. Page A12 NYT April 8, 1982. 
9. Page A15 Washington Post April 11, 1982. 
10. "The successful seizure of territory by force, in lieu of negotiations, could not be allowed to become the lesson derived nor the final conclusion drawn. With the history of western weakness in the recent past, it probably would have sent a very serious signal around the world, especially to the Soviet Union." Alexander Haig quoted in "The Little Platoon p 15. Michael Charlton, Basil Blackwell, 1989. 
11. 40 Commando and the Air Defense Troop were stood down on 31 March 1982 and were told: "no units are required." Clapp and Tailyour. "Amphibious Assault Falklands." London: Cooper. 1996. P 14. 
12. R.W.Apple in the New York Times May 6, 1982. 
13. Captain James Cook RN in "Captain James Cook" by Richard Hough. New York: Norton, 1997. 
14. Grytviken, South Georgia's chief settlement, means "Pot Harbor" in Norwegian. To this day Norwegian sailors remember the stench of hot blubber. 
15. Thatcher p 205: "It was on this day (19 April) that the War Cabinet authorized the operation to repossess South Georgia..." Given the 7 April order to Vaux' 42 Commando to get up a force to invade South Georgia Thatcher may be seen as marching ahead of her War Cabinet. 
16. "We had no advance planning figures whatsoever. .... Aapparently even they (the marines) didn't know what they were to get." Captain Shane Redmond commenting on RFA Tidespring's loadout for Operation Paraquat in Perkins p 116. 
17. Vaux was told that the Argentinean forces on South Georgia had "heavy naval support." No capability for heavy support existed anywhere in that navy. Poor intelligence got Britain into the war and bedevilled it throughout the conflict. Vaux p 17. 
18. Allied Tactical Publication 8 the US, British and NATO bible for amphibious operations was the governing document for the Falklands war. 
19. HMS Antrim, a County class destroyer of 5500 tons, was launched in October 1967. It carried 2 X 4.5" guns, a modest ASW capability and excellent communications gear. 
20. When LtCol Richard Eve RA the artillery officer assigned to Operation Paraquat boarded Antrim he was given an Admiral's cabin because Young knew him to senior to Major Sheridan. Eve pointed out to Young that whatever their ranks Sheridan, as land force commander, was automatically senior to all other ground officers and graciously relinquished his spacious quarters to Sheridan. 
21. Clapp p 54. 
22. Interview LtCol Sheridan 21 Sep 98. 
23. The NGS contains two highly trained types of men drawn from the Royal Artillery and Royal Navy; one observes fall of shot either on the ground or from a heliocopter and the second works aboard the firing ship as liaison with its gunnery officer. Movement of the firing ship and possible movement of the target make this a complicated affair. 
24. X Files. 
25. Clapp paraphrasing Admiral Fieldhouse. Clapp p54. 
26. "Apart from the Royal Marines everyone was learning the amphibious trade as we went along." Captain Brian Young RN in Perkins p 121. 
27. It surprised the young marines and their officers that Captain Young showed so marked a lack of interest in them and in their activities during the trip south. He was until they landed their commander. 
28. Lieutenant Mike Tidd RN and Flight Lieutenant Andy Pulford RAF had troop experience from Northern Ireland and with Commando forces in Norway. Neither the SAS nor the Royal Marines had dedicated aircraft as integrated members of their forces. US and Soviet special forces did enjoy this luxury. 
29. HMS Antrim 250/3/1 14 April 82. X Files. 
30. Interview LtCol Sheridan 27 Oct 1982. 
31. Freedman claims p 220: "In this one exceptional case....Britain did have satellite pictures from the United States, taken on a satellite's final orbit. This made it possible to identify the location as well as note the weaknesses, of Argentine defenses." If this statement is true the entire SAS & SBS recon effort was duplicative and unnecessary. 
32. "I gave him the job and could not tell him how to do it. I advised against the Fortuna route but they thought they could do it." Interview LtCol. Sheridan 27 October 1998. 
33. " I could tell right away we were not convincing him (Delves) that the Fortuna Glacier was a rotten option......The truth is that it matters little if you are experienced or a novice. The weather that constantly changes the mood of the glacier is utterly indifferent." Barker p 180. 
34. Interview LtCol. Sheridan 27 October 1998. 
35. "It is widely accepted that Argentina would not make a significant effort to hold South Georgia against a determined assault." James Markham writing from Buenas Aires in the New York Times, April 14, 1982 a week before military action began around South Georgia. It is not known if this view percolated through the British command structure and if it did what was made of it. 
36. Barker p ---. 
37. Falklands/So. Georgia Conflict as seen from Signy Island. P.41 A.D.Hemmings typed manuscript submitted to BAS 2 July 1984. 
38. "Argentine planners concluded immediately (21 April 1982) that the British were planning to retake South Georgia. On 24 April it was reported that two destroyers and a tanker were near the island. The British Chiefs of Staff assessed that an attack was imminent." Freedman Signals of War p 219. Professor Freedman did not divulge the source of this information. 
39. Although it could not be known before British forces landed, Argentinean troops failed to dig new defensive positions but simply occupied abandoned Royal Marines' trenches. 
40. Interview with BAS personnel Nov. 1997 
41. Op. Cit. 
42. Mountain Troop inserted from three helicopters not two as stated in Times Team "War In The Falklands" p 149. 
43. X Files 
44. Thatcher Op.Cit. p 205. 
45. Barker p 183. 
46. Sergeant Mac Lemann RM, Mountain Leader 1st Class, quoted in Perkins p 140. 
47. Author's experience. 
48. Brown Mountain was with Bore Valley/Mountain a piece of ground whose seizure by Sheridan would be essential to the recapture of Grytviken. 
49. BAS maintained caches stored in caves for their own members use. Neither SAS nor SBS knew their locations. 
50. Woodward p 105. In view of the importance attached to Paraquat's success it surprises that Woodward did not order Young to engage the Santa Fe with his two experienced destroyer captains in Plymouth and Antrim and the overwhelming technological superiority of the nuclear HMS Conqueror. 
51. Santa Fe was a "Guppy 2" conversion from an older US submarine class. The conversion was not widely believed to be successful. 
52. Barkers statement p 184: "We, too, decided to call off the operation, and, as darkness fell we recalled the troops." is inaccurate. The SBS had been trying for more than a day to exfiltrate. Anyhow it was not Barker's decision but Young's, Sheridan's and the SBS'. 
53. While Burls' group would, if discovered, have been compelled to fire upon and perhaps kill Argentinean marines, the task force remained under stern injunct from Northwood not to fire upon the Argentinean C-130s that now shadowed the sea force in what Thatcher proclaimed to be British air space. Northwood seemed uncomprehending of war's essential purpose, destruction of the enemy's will to fight. 
54. Barker p 185. Captain Barker seemed upset at the submarine's presence and omitted the fact that even plodding Endurance could outrun its ancient diesel foe as long as they both floated. 
55. Barker p 188. and Thompson, No Picnic p 30. 
56. Lt Col Guy Sheridan "Operation Paraquat" in The Elite Vol. 5 Issue 56. 
57. Barker, who had commanded an ASW ship, is adamant on this subject. See Barker p 188. 
58. Barker p 187. 
59. After the war Bicain admitted that a damaged hatch compromised Santa Fe's water tight integrity. To have submerged would have sunk the boat. 
60. The naval gunfire spotters, one aloft in a Wasp from Endurance and another at Dartmouth Point, called the fall of shot very accurately. The job is not glamorous and extremely important. 
61. One Argentine sailor on Santa Fe suffered a leg wound from the air attack at sea. The medical officer in Sheridan's command element lacked the equipment to assist the seriously distressed man. A helicopter evacuated him to Antrim where his leg was amputated. 
62. Thatcher was also confused about the garrison's head: "A certain Captain Astiz had been in charge of the garrision there ( Grytviken)." Downing Street Years p 208. 
63. Ibid p209. 

In "Looking For Trouble" p 344 General de la Billiere wrote: "...a combined force of Royal Marines, SAS and SBS fought their way into the former whaling base of Grytviken and recaptured South Georgia in the first victory of the war ...." This statement is wholly erroneous because disabling the Santa Fe was the first victory and because there was no fighting on South Georgia leading up to its recapture.

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SAS Operations

When Argentina invaded the Falklands on 2nd April 1982, both Brigadier Peter de la Billiere and Lieutenant-Colonel Mike Rose, the Commander of 22 SAS, fought hard to have the regiment included in the task force. By early April, members of both D and G squadrons were on their way.

South Georgia

During the operation to retake South Georgia, bad weather trapped SAS men on a glacier and a Wessex 3 and two Wessex 5s were sent to retrieve them. The first Wessex lifted off as the wind whipped up the snow. The Wessex from RFA Tidespring lifted off, but the pilot lost his bearing in the snow and crashed, skidding for some 50 yards, with the Wessex tipping over. The other two helicopters now embarked their troops. They lifted and landed next to the crashed Wessex and took on her aircrew and soldiers. Both aircraft dumped fuel to carry the extra load.

Visibility by this time was practically zero and the wind and snow had not abated. The helicopters lifted off, and the Wessex 3, equipped with radar, took off with the Wessex 5 following astern and made their way down the glacier. Seconds later, the helicopters traversed a small ridge and the Wessex 5 flared violently and struck the top of the ridge. It rolled onto its side and could not be contacted by radio. The remaining overloaded helicopter returned to the ship, some 30 miles away to the north, and disembarked its passengers. The Wessex 3 returned to the crash site, but was unable to land. They made contact by radio and confirmed there were no serious casualties. The Wessex 3 returned to Antrim to wait for a break in the weather. An hour later an opportunity presented itself and the Wessex 3 flew back and embarked the survivors and was flown back to Antrim by Lt-Commander Ian Stanley RN, who was awarded the DSO.

The following night, 23rd April, 2 Section SBS was landed by helicopter. Five Gemini inflatable craft set out with troops of D Squadron's Boat troop aboard and two suffered engine failure. One of the crews was picked up by helicopter while the other crew got to shore. The Antrim group moved in again, on the 24th April, to drop off more troops and in doing so, located and beached the Argentine submarine Sante Fe. The Antrim's small company of Marines was landed following a hasty conference and the seventy-five Marines, SBS and SAS, under naval gunfire support, landed by helicopter. When they reached the settlement of Grytviken, they found white sheets fluttering from several windows. An Argentine officer complained to the SAS that they had just walked through his minefield. At 5:15am, the Argentine commander formally surrendered. The following morning, after threatening defiance by radio overnight, the small enemy garrison at Leith, along the coast, surrendered without resistance. The scrap merchants, whose activities had precipitated the entire war, were also taken into custody, for repatriation to the mainland. To complete the victory, a helicopter picked up a weak emergency beacon signal from the southernmost tip of the island, Stromness Bay. The helicopter homed in on it and found the lost three-man SAS patrol from the missing Gemini. They had paddled ashore with only a few hundred yards of land left between them and Antarctica. No British troops had been lost.

Goose Green Diversionary

The SAS mounted a diversionary raid at Goose Green on the night before the main landing at San Carlos. 60 men of D Squadron hit the garrison at Goose Green with the aim of simulating a battlion-sized attack. The soldiers marched for 20 hours to reach the hills north of Darwin before attacking the Argentines with LAW and MILAN missiles, machine gun and rifle fire. The enemy were taken completely by surprise and were unable to pinpoint the SAS positions and responded with only sporadic fire. Early next morning the SAS withdrew, the main landing complete.

Pebble Island

On the night of 14-15 May, the SAS carried out a daring raid on the Pebble Island Airstrip on West Falkland. Twenty members of Mountain Troop, D Squadron, led by Captain John Hamilton, assaulted the airstrip to destroy all eleven aircraft. The attack was supported by fire from HMS Glamorgan, while the SAS used 81mm mortar, M203 grenade launchers, 66mm LAWS, and small arms fire to drive the Argentinians to cover. The Argentines were forced to take cover and the SAS moved onto the airstrip ad fixed explosive charges to the aircraft. The assault destroyed six Pucaras, four Turbo-Mentors and a Skyvan transport before the party withdrew.

Despite some last minute hitches, the aircraft had all been destroyed or rendered irreparable and one Argentinian lay dead. Two of the Squadron were wounded by shrapnel when a mine exploded, although not seriously hurt.

Please note that BSW dose NOT profit from any sales of this painting. 
We are very grateful to the people at Cranston Fine Arts 
for allowing us to display David Pentlands work

The Sea King Crash

On 19th May, the Regiment suffered a tragic loss when a Sea King crashed while cross-decking troops from HMS Hermes to HMS Intrepid and killed 22 men.  The Sea King had taken off from H.M.S. Hermes at dusk. The Aircraft was slightly over loaded but because it was short fight the pilot reduced his fuel load to lighten the helicopter. At 300 ft the Sea King started it's decent towards H.M.S. Intrepid. those on board heard a thump, then another from the engine above them. The Sea King dipped once then dived . Within four seconds it hit the water. Some men were killed instantly and other knocked unconscious in the initial impact. Amazingly 9 men managed to scramble out of the open side door before the helicopter slipped below the waves. They were the only survivors. Rescuers found bird feathers floating on the surface were the helicopter had impacted the water. It is thought that the Sea King was the victim of a bird strike. One theory is at the Sea King was hit by a Black Browed Albatross which has a 8 ft wing span. The SAS lost 18 men on this night. The regiment had not lost so many men at one tine since the end of the second world war. The accident killed a member of the Royal Signals and the only RAF casualty of the war Flt Lt G.W. Hawkins.

West Falkland

On the 10th of June Hamilton and his four man patrol were using a well established OP near Port Howard when they were surrounded and out numbered by Argentine forces from the 1st Section 601 Combat Aviation Battalion. Two SAS men managed to get away but Hamilton and his signaler, Sergeant Fosenka, were pinned down. Hamilton was hit in the back by enemy fire and told Fosenka to get out while he covered him. " You carry on, I'll cover your back" Moments later Hamilton was killed. Sergeant Fosenka was later captured when he ran out of ammunition.  Fosenka was not badly treated by the Argentines and Hamilton was buried with full military honors by the Argentines.  The senior Argentine officer praised the heroism of the SAS officer. Hamilton was posthumously awarded the Military Cross. Some think he should have been given a VC. But because no British Officer was present during  this action (apart from Hamilton himself ) no VC was awarded.

Thank you to Julian M Taylor for some of the above information on Captain G. J. Hamilton

Mount Kent

Using Mount Kent, some 64 km behind enemy lines, as a forward operating base under the noses of the Argentine 12 Regiment, also on the mountain, the SAS continued their reconnaissance role until 26th May, when the Argentines were hurriedly airlifted to Goose Green by a mix of Huey and Chinook helicopters, leaving much personnel equipment behind. This sudden move left the mountain, which was dominant high ground, open to seizure by No.3 Commando Brigade. On 30th May, Sea King helicopters with Royal Marines aboard, took off but were forced by severe weather to turn back to San Carlos.

In the late afternoon of 31st May, elements of K Company, 42 Commando and two SAS officers, took off with the aim of arriving after dark. the helicopter pilots, using passive night goggles to mount a ground-hugging approach. This first liftoff had to land as many men as possible and were filled beyond capacity with men and weapons. They arrived behind a ridgeline about two miles from the summit of Mount Kent, where they were confronted by the sight of a night fire-fight in progress . The Marines quickly spread out and took cover and secured their landing zone as they offloaded their weapons and equipment. The firefight died down and Major Cedric Delves, of D Squadron, 22 SAS, appeared to assure his boss all was well. The SAS had encountered an Argentine patrol and had destroyed it.

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As the task force set sail from Britain in April 1982, to reclaim the Falklands, the Special Boat Service was already reaching the scene. At the time of the Argentine invasion, the SBS was engaged in winter exercises in northern Norway, 40 Commando was training at home, 45 Commando in Scotland and another company was in Brunei. 42 Commando was the only unit to go to Norway because of stringent cost cutting.

The SBS, returning from Norway, were due to go on leave as soon as they returned from Norway, but instead, their departure was blocked the night before the invasion, as the SBS OC, made the assumption that there could be trouble any second. The following morning his fears were confirmed and all his units were alerted to standby.

Within 24 hours of the signal ordering the SBS to stand to, on the 1st April, the SBS were on the move.

First came 2 SBS, setting off with a strong command team by air to Ascension Island, where they would catch either HMS Spartan or HMS Splendid to take them south. However, the plan was aborted en route and 2 SBS was picked up by RFA Fort Austin. At Ascension, D Squadron, SAS, joined them, bringing the force up to a combined total of around 50 men. M Company, 42 RM Commando, soon joined them. The men were at sea before they learned that South Georgia was their intended destination.

6 SBS joined HMS Conqueror at Faslane and set off for the South Atlantic. 3 SBS was the last section to leave, deployed aboard RFA Stromness with a further 12 men joining at Ascension. 1 SBS remained in Poole to deal with any emergency and Special Forces liaison groups.

South Georgia

The assault on South Georgia was codenamed 'Operation Paraquat'. On the way the SBS and SAS tested their equipment and practiced launching from Fort Austin. The elderly outboard motors failed often, and the men found themselves having to paddle back to the ship in these practices.

On 12th April, Fort Austin sighted HMS Endurance, and over the next day the SBS and SAS men heading for South Georgia were cross-decked to HMS Endurance along with their stores, equipment, boats, and supplies for the Endurance. Two Wessex helicopters helped with the shipping. HMS Endurance and Fort Austin were joined by HMS Antrim, HMS Plymouth and RFA tanker Tidespring. The reoccupation of South Georgia was planned aboard HMS Antrim; Endurance would put the SBS ashore at Gryviken and King Edward Point, with the SAS landing at Fortuna Glacier to reconnoitre Leith Harbour, Stromness and Grass Island. For more details see 'Operation Paraquat'.

'Paraquat' concluded with a landing of a 75-man strong force made up of SAS, SBS and Royal Marines from Antrim, which was only half the strength of the Argentine garrison. When the force reached the Argentine garrison at Grytviken, the entire place was covered in white sheets and the Argentineans surrendered.

'Operation Corporate'-The Recapture of The Falkland Islands

The 6 SBS from South Georgia joined 3 SBS in the advance fleet. The SBS would reconnoitre three separate areas of the Falklands and maintain patrols in advance of the main landings.

In addition to being in enemy controlled territory, the SBS had to send reports by Morse code instead of radio, and the beach recce reports and charts had to be delivered in person as these were far too complex for sending by Morse code. Sea King Mk 4 helicopters were used to fly the patrols in, although occasionally the Geminis were used to go ashore. Helicopter movements were only carried out at night, and once dropped off, the SBS teams dug into the coverless hillsides and remained hidden for days at a time, as the Argentine forces searched for them.

As the conflict progressed, the SBS had teams scattered throughout the islands, with patrols deployed to various locations for up to a week at a time before withdrawing to report and then being inserted to another location.

The teams usually numbered four men who, once landed, would proceed on foot to their observation side, lying up in temporary hides during the daylight hours. A trio of hides would be built, one for the men and the other two for the substantial supplies necessary for a seven-day recce.

Although the Argentine forces came close to discovering SBS patrols on numerous occasions, the worst incident of all was when two men went missing from a patrol, which caused concern to SBS control. The two corporals were part of a team that ran into an Argentine patrol and were split up, although they avoided actual contact with the patrol. The two corporals followed their procedures and were eventually, seven days later, picked up and returned to the ship.

The Argentine fish factory-ship provided another SBS task, 2 SBS were despatched to board and apprehend the vessel, but while they were en route, the ship was attacked by two Harriers and was listing badly by the time the SB arrived and boarded her. The SBS discovered charts and operational orders before setting charges, rescuing the crew, and blowing up the ship. The seized orders showed she had been shadowing the British fleet.

Immediately prior to the San Carlos landing, an Argentine company moved into the area and the SBS were tasked with clearing them out before the landing. Using a thermal imager, the SBS located the Argentineans from one of Antrim's Wessex helicopters and HMS Antrim bombarded the target with 4.5-inch naval shellfire for two hours, while the Wessex landed the SBS nearby. The SBS then moved in, calling for the Argentines to surrender, but receiving only gunfire in response. The SBS gave them one more chance to give up before moving forward, killing twelve, wounding three, and taking nine prisoners. The Argentineans had been on Fanning Head manning anti-tank guns and mortars, which would have been able to inflict damage on the British landings if they had not been put out of action. The remainder of the company were in Port San Carlos, sheltering in houses and were not discovered until after the landings began; two Royal Marine Gazelles were shot down by these Argentineans as the landings started.

The landings went on unopposed and on the north coast, by Port Salavdor Water, 6 SBS from HMS Fearless was inserted to establish a forward base on Green Island ahead of the Commando's advance. The section carried out reconnaissance of Port Louis and Green Patch before the Commandos arrived. 2 SBS joined them and operated in the Teal area, guiding 3 Para into Teal, before moving on to observe an enemy company on Long Island Mountain.

These operations were followed by the SBS removing an enemy observation post, during which one member of the SBS was killed in a friendly fire incident. This resulted in closer cooperation, the SBS team leader having strayed onto the SAS's Green Patch operational zone.

The SBS continued its operations, scouting West Falkland for enemy bases and airstrips.

Pebble Island

An Argentine force was located on Pebble Island numbering between 30 and 50 men. The SBS planned an attack with 36 men and two Harriers, however the raid was overtaken by the Argentine surrender at Port Stanley. An SBS major took the surrender of  Pebble Island and its 112-strong garrison.

Final Action

As the main force advanced on Stanley, the SBS and SAS shared a joint action. On 12th June, 2 Para attacked Wireless Ridge, while five miles west of them a six-man team from 3 SBS formed a volunteer raiding party with D and G Squadrons SAS, to divert enemy attention from the main thrust by creating a diversionary assault from the sea. The task was unplanned and a spur-of the-moment operation.

The SBS team spent a day in an observation post, before moving across the Murrell River in Rigid Raiders with a troop from D Squadron, SAS, which were driven by men from the Royal Marines 1st Raiding Squadron. The raiders were hidden off Kidney Island until they were ready for the assault.

On the night of 13-14th June, the men approached the target area, bypassing the berthed Argentinean hospital ship Bahia Paraiso. As they did so, the hospital ship turned on its searchlights, spotting the raiders and opened fire with everything they had, certain they faced a full-scale sea borne assault.

The raiders withdrew, with one of the craft badly damaged. The raiders reached the shore, with an SBS corporal and two SAS troopers having been wounded. The effort provided the needed diversion for 2 Para and saved some lives by diverting Argentine attention from the Para's assault.

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Argentine Air Defenses
found at surrender in and around Port Stanley and Goose Green